Regionalization of Conflict, the economic side

One of my academic interests in regard to the study of African conflict is the so called regionalization of conflict. That is to say, due to a number of circumstances including the manner in which borders were drawn, the presence of co-ethnics across international borders, topographical and geographical features, violence within one state can oftentimes quickly spread to its neighbors. This is a particular problem in Africa where many of the borders are artificially drawn. I usually focus on this phenomenon in regard to the spread of violence and war. The ongoing civil strife in Kenya, however, has highlighted in my mind, what may be a mutated version of the regionalization of conflict concept. A situation whereby domestic violence in one state has dilatory effects on its neighbors not by spreading violence but by hurting the regional economy.

What am I talking about? Over the past two months, civil violence has exploded across Kenya as a result of President Mwai Kibaki's rigging of elections in order to keep from power opposition leader Raila Odinga. Much of the violence is overlaid with an ethnic component. Kibaki is part of the majority Kikuyu ethnic group which has dominated the country since independence in December 1963. Odinga, is a Luo, and he represents the smaller ethnic groups in Kenya who have lost out to the Kikuyu.

One of the consequences of the violence has been the disruption of international trade that moves through Kenya; the economic key to east and central Africa because of its ports, rail, and road links to the interior. Thus, what happens in Kenya, affects Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and southern Sudan.

The bulk of the trade goes through the the deep water port of Mombasa on the southeastern coast, the largest port in East Africa. From there, goods move by rail through Nairobi and into Uganda, and from there by road to Rwanda, Burundi, southern Sudan and eastern DRC. The areas of Kenya that have seen the most violence are the population centers in the Rift Valley through which the railway runs including Nairobi, Naivasha, Nakuru, and Eldoret.

The logical follow-on question is why not divert the goods someplace else. The problems are as follows. First, there are no other large seaports or rail lines in Kenya to avoid the violent areas. Second, Somalia to the north is not an option because of internal collapse and pirates in Somali waters. (Yes, I did write pirates.) Finally, Tanzania would be the logical alternative but because Tanzania was not originally a British colony, the rail network built in Tanzania does not go to Uganda and there are few roads into Burundi, Rwanda, and eastern DRC. Goods can be moved from Dar es Salaam to Uganda, but it costs much more, is further away, takes longer and Dar es Salaam cannot handle the same amount of goods as Mombasa. The only truly practical way to get to the Great Lakes region is through Uganda and the only way to deliver vast amounts of goods to Uganda is by rail or road through Kenya. Mombasa is 750 miles from Kampala, the capital of Uganda.

What are the effects? For starters the UN has reported a decrease of humanitarian aid moving through Kampala which originates in Kenya. An alternative consideration has been moving the aid from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to Port Bell on Lake Victoria, and then across to Uganda but the infrastructure does not exist for such an operation. Thus, if violence persists in Kenya for the foreseeable future, shortages may occur and prices may increase across the region. Something to think about when the news reports on developments in Kenya, it is not just Kenyans who stand to lose from continuing violence.