ASMEA Conference

For all those in Washington, DC this is a public service announcement. Tomorrow and Saturday, April 25 and 26, ASMEA (The Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa) will be holding its annual conference at the Marriot Wardman Park Hotel with a keynote speech being delivered by Prof. Bernard Lewis at 1230 PM on Saturday. The conference is titled "The Evolution of Islamic Politics, Philosophy, and Culture in the Middle East and Africa: From Traditional Limits to Modern Extremes," and will feature panels and roundtable discussions with leading scholars in the field. For more information please check out the ASMEA website. Also, as long as your on the website, please read the book review I wrote on Nicholas Shaxson's "Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil."

The Ponant is Freed

On Friday, the ordeal of the French yacht, Ponant, which had been hijacked by Somali pirates, was resolved. In last week's post, I speculated that the end would come either with paying ransom or military action. As it turned out, both happened. The details have not been confirmed but as far as I can tell from various news reports, the owners of the yacht, CMA-CGM, paid a ransom of $2 million dollars for the release of the 30 man crew who were brought safely ashore. The pirates then attempted to flee the area in three pickup trucks but were tracked by French attack helicopters. One car was disabled by a sniper shot and the 6 pirates inside were captured by French commandos. The video can be seen here. In addition to capturing 6 of the 12 pirates, the French armed forces chief of staff, Gen. Jean-Louis Georgelin said that some of the ransom money was recovered as well. The pirates have been taken into French custody and the French government has asked the Somalis for permission to extradite them back to France.

A couple questions to think about. One, why couldn't the French commandos capture all of the pirates. With 2 boats, 4 or 5 helicopters and 50 commandos, why was only one car disabled? And why, as it seems, did they have to be captured and not killed outright? Gen. Georgelin said in a press conference that "No shots were fired directly at the pirates"? I understated the need to avoid collateral damage, but if the sniper could hit the engine of a moving car, the pirates could have been hit too.

Second, what effect will this have as a deterrence measure? If half of the pirates got away with some of the money, the incentive may still exist to continue their hijacking ways, especially if the pirates are smarter about the nationality of the vessels they attack. That is to say, stay away from vessels belonging to countries with commando teams that can deploy to the region.

Third, was the operation coordinated between the French charter company and the French government, or did the company expect to pay the money for the crew and the ship, and the military acted independently. Obviously, it seems that avoiding casualties among the crew was the overriding factor, so I am not clear on exactly what the French commando mission was about. Were they trying to capture the pirates to bring them to justice, perhaps recover some of the ransom, or make a show of force to prevent a future incident?

Piracy off Somalia

The focus of parties interested in African security on violent conflict and international terrrorism can often relegate other important issues, such as piracy and narcotics, to the policy and scholarship periphery. The recent hijacking of a French yacht off the coast of Somalia has once again brought attention to the problem of piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa and I wish to address the topic today.

On Friday, the Ponant, a luxury French yacht with a crew of 32 and no passengers was seized in the Gulf of Aden by Somali pirates and is now anchored off Puntland in northeastern Somalia. The vessel is being monitored by a French naval frigate in the the Indian ocean on NATO duties as well as French aircraft based in nearby Djibouti. The situation will likely be resolved in one of two ways, either a ransom will be paid or military action will be taken to free the crew and the ship.

This incident is not a rare occurence. The Somali coastal waters are considered to be among the most hazardous in the world and the International Maritime Bureau advises merchant ships to stay at least 200 nautical miles offshore. In 2007, more than 25 ships were seized in the region despite a multinational naval force that patrols the area. In February, a Danish-owned tug was released after paying a ransom of $700,000. An act condemned by the Somali government because it would only encourage further piracy.

The problem stems from a combination of complete lawlessness, an absence of economic opportunities in Somalia, and geography. Since the outbreak of civil war 18 years ago, Somalia has been torn by anarchy, famine, drought, and clan-based warlords. The Somali central government exercises little control over the country, has no effective domestic law enforcement, let alone a functioning navy. It is therefore unsurprising that few options exist for men seeking to feed their families. A large part of the population is dependent on United Nations World Food Programme food aid. Taken together with the Somalia's strategic position; 3,300 km of coastline bordering the Indian ocean approaches to Kenya and the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez canal, the major trade route between Asia and Europe, it is understandable why the area cannot by bypassed and why piracy has become a popular method to make a living.

Beginning with a spike of incidents in 2005, (34 up from 1 the year before) Somalia quickly became one of the world's most dangerous areas for merchant vessels. Pirates in speed boats armed with AK-47's and RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), attacked a cruise ship, lured smaller vessels by shooting flares and making distress calls, and attacked ships carrying United Nations food aid. In response, a multinational naval task force was set up to monitor and deter pirates but despite the efforts, the problem continues.

International law (a favorite topic of mine) has also gotten in the way. Legally, the naval task force has no standing once ships enter Somali territorial waters, for example, ships delivering aid. Normally, the national government is responsible for protecting shipping in territorial waters but Somalia has neither the resources nor the infrastructure to combat the pirates, who by default enjoy free reign. Thus, ransom has become the solution for freeing hijacked vessels and will likely continue to be the primary method until such a time as the Somali government can stop the piracy on its own. I suspect that there will be an increase in naval patrols by NATO and other concerned states but until the pirates' bases are removed on land, they will freely operate at sea.

As for the Ponant, French counter-terrrorism and hostage rescue teams are standing by in Djibouti should they be called on but even if they are, few other countries have the capabilities to provide such forces in the event that they are needed and should not be viewed as a viable long term solution.

The Comoros

Back from an extended hiatus, I wish to discuss last week's events in the Comoros.

The conflict in the Indian Ocean nation of the Comoros has now come to a resolution. After a brief fight following the seaborne landing of 600 Comoran and 1,500 AU troops from Tanzania, Senegal, Libya, and Sudan last Tuesday March 25, the Comoran federal government now has retaken control of Anjouan island which had been under the control of rebel president, Mohamed Bacar. Bacar escaped to the nearby French island of Mayotte and from there was taken by French military plane to Reunion. The Comoran government has requested the extradition of Bacar back to the Comoros to stand trial and has announced that elections will be held within three months for a new island president. The Comoros three main islands Grand Comore, Moheli, and Anjouan each have their own president who then rotate as head of the federal government. Hopefully, this will mark a new beginning for the Comoros which since independence in 1975 has experienced over 20 coups.

A number of lessons to take away from this episode. First, the threat of a renegade leader in a weak state is particularly acute and in many cases cannot be solved without international intervention as was the case in the Comoros. Without external support, Bacar would not have been deposed. Second, though efforts in Sudan have largely failed to get off the ground and the AU force in Somalia is too small to undertake serious operations, in the future AU forces may be able to conduct small scale operations similar to the Comoros. The Comoros operation should be a boost to the AU as an organization able to successfully coordinate and deploy multinational forces. Finally, it will be interesting to see what France does with Bacar. The French government should extradite him back to the Comoros to stand trial but if they don't I can't say I will be surprised. It would be just another incident of the French meddling in the affairs of a former colony.