Recap of ASMEA Conference

This is a link to the ASMEA Conference highlights. Two videos are on the page, the first is the keynote address by Prof. Bernard Lewis and the second is the video from the roundtable discussion on current instability in Africa.

ASMEA Conference

For all those in Washington, DC this is a public service announcement. Tomorrow and Saturday, April 25 and 26, ASMEA (The Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa) will be holding its annual conference at the Marriot Wardman Park Hotel with a keynote speech being delivered by Prof. Bernard Lewis at 1230 PM on Saturday. The conference is titled "The Evolution of Islamic Politics, Philosophy, and Culture in the Middle East and Africa: From Traditional Limits to Modern Extremes," and will feature panels and roundtable discussions with leading scholars in the field. For more information please check out the ASMEA website. Also, as long as your on the website, please read the book review I wrote on Nicholas Shaxson's "Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil."

The Ponant is Freed

On Friday, the ordeal of the French yacht, Ponant, which had been hijacked by Somali pirates, was resolved. In last week's post, I speculated that the end would come either with paying ransom or military action. As it turned out, both happened. The details have not been confirmed but as far as I can tell from various news reports, the owners of the yacht, CMA-CGM, paid a ransom of $2 million dollars for the release of the 30 man crew who were brought safely ashore. The pirates then attempted to flee the area in three pickup trucks but were tracked by French attack helicopters. One car was disabled by a sniper shot and the 6 pirates inside were captured by French commandos. The video can be seen here. In addition to capturing 6 of the 12 pirates, the French armed forces chief of staff, Gen. Jean-Louis Georgelin said that some of the ransom money was recovered as well. The pirates have been taken into French custody and the French government has asked the Somalis for permission to extradite them back to France.

A couple questions to think about. One, why couldn't the French commandos capture all of the pirates. With 2 boats, 4 or 5 helicopters and 50 commandos, why was only one car disabled? And why, as it seems, did they have to be captured and not killed outright? Gen. Georgelin said in a press conference that "No shots were fired directly at the pirates"? I understated the need to avoid collateral damage, but if the sniper could hit the engine of a moving car, the pirates could have been hit too.

Second, what effect will this have as a deterrence measure? If half of the pirates got away with some of the money, the incentive may still exist to continue their hijacking ways, especially if the pirates are smarter about the nationality of the vessels they attack. That is to say, stay away from vessels belonging to countries with commando teams that can deploy to the region.

Third, was the operation coordinated between the French charter company and the French government, or did the company expect to pay the money for the crew and the ship, and the military acted independently. Obviously, it seems that avoiding casualties among the crew was the overriding factor, so I am not clear on exactly what the French commando mission was about. Were they trying to capture the pirates to bring them to justice, perhaps recover some of the ransom, or make a show of force to prevent a future incident?

Piracy off Somalia

The focus of parties interested in African security on violent conflict and international terrrorism can often relegate other important issues, such as piracy and narcotics, to the policy and scholarship periphery. The recent hijacking of a French yacht off the coast of Somalia has once again brought attention to the problem of piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa and I wish to address the topic today.

On Friday, the Ponant, a luxury French yacht with a crew of 32 and no passengers was seized in the Gulf of Aden by Somali pirates and is now anchored off Puntland in northeastern Somalia. The vessel is being monitored by a French naval frigate in the the Indian ocean on NATO duties as well as French aircraft based in nearby Djibouti. The situation will likely be resolved in one of two ways, either a ransom will be paid or military action will be taken to free the crew and the ship.

This incident is not a rare occurence. The Somali coastal waters are considered to be among the most hazardous in the world and the International Maritime Bureau advises merchant ships to stay at least 200 nautical miles offshore. In 2007, more than 25 ships were seized in the region despite a multinational naval force that patrols the area. In February, a Danish-owned tug was released after paying a ransom of $700,000. An act condemned by the Somali government because it would only encourage further piracy.

The problem stems from a combination of complete lawlessness, an absence of economic opportunities in Somalia, and geography. Since the outbreak of civil war 18 years ago, Somalia has been torn by anarchy, famine, drought, and clan-based warlords. The Somali central government exercises little control over the country, has no effective domestic law enforcement, let alone a functioning navy. It is therefore unsurprising that few options exist for men seeking to feed their families. A large part of the population is dependent on United Nations World Food Programme food aid. Taken together with the Somalia's strategic position; 3,300 km of coastline bordering the Indian ocean approaches to Kenya and the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez canal, the major trade route between Asia and Europe, it is understandable why the area cannot by bypassed and why piracy has become a popular method to make a living.

Beginning with a spike of incidents in 2005, (34 up from 1 the year before) Somalia quickly became one of the world's most dangerous areas for merchant vessels. Pirates in speed boats armed with AK-47's and RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), attacked a cruise ship, lured smaller vessels by shooting flares and making distress calls, and attacked ships carrying United Nations food aid. In response, a multinational naval task force was set up to monitor and deter pirates but despite the efforts, the problem continues.

International law (a favorite topic of mine) has also gotten in the way. Legally, the naval task force has no standing once ships enter Somali territorial waters, for example, ships delivering aid. Normally, the national government is responsible for protecting shipping in territorial waters but Somalia has neither the resources nor the infrastructure to combat the pirates, who by default enjoy free reign. Thus, ransom has become the solution for freeing hijacked vessels and will likely continue to be the primary method until such a time as the Somali government can stop the piracy on its own. I suspect that there will be an increase in naval patrols by NATO and other concerned states but until the pirates' bases are removed on land, they will freely operate at sea.

As for the Ponant, French counter-terrrorism and hostage rescue teams are standing by in Djibouti should they be called on but even if they are, few other countries have the capabilities to provide such forces in the event that they are needed and should not be viewed as a viable long term solution.

The Comoros

Back from an extended hiatus, I wish to discuss last week's events in the Comoros.

The conflict in the Indian Ocean nation of the Comoros has now come to a resolution. After a brief fight following the seaborne landing of 600 Comoran and 1,500 AU troops from Tanzania, Senegal, Libya, and Sudan last Tuesday March 25, the Comoran federal government now has retaken control of Anjouan island which had been under the control of rebel president, Mohamed Bacar. Bacar escaped to the nearby French island of Mayotte and from there was taken by French military plane to Reunion. The Comoran government has requested the extradition of Bacar back to the Comoros to stand trial and has announced that elections will be held within three months for a new island president. The Comoros three main islands Grand Comore, Moheli, and Anjouan each have their own president who then rotate as head of the federal government. Hopefully, this will mark a new beginning for the Comoros which since independence in 1975 has experienced over 20 coups.

A number of lessons to take away from this episode. First, the threat of a renegade leader in a weak state is particularly acute and in many cases cannot be solved without international intervention as was the case in the Comoros. Without external support, Bacar would not have been deposed. Second, though efforts in Sudan have largely failed to get off the ground and the AU force in Somalia is too small to undertake serious operations, in the future AU forces may be able to conduct small scale operations similar to the Comoros. The Comoros operation should be a boost to the AU as an organization able to successfully coordinate and deploy multinational forces. Finally, it will be interesting to see what France does with Bacar. The French government should extradite him back to the Comoros to stand trial but if they don't I can't say I will be surprised. It would be just another incident of the French meddling in the affairs of a former colony.

Evaluating US Policy Options on the Horn of Africa

On Tuesday, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on Evaluating US Policy Options on the Horn of Africa. Two panels testified; the first consisting of government officials, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Jendayi Frazier, assistant administrator for Africa at USAID, Katherine Almquist, and deputy assistant secretary of defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whalen. The second panel was non-government officials: Dr. David Shinn, adjunct professor at GWU, Lynn Fredericksson, advocacy director for Africa at Amnesty International, and Col. Thomas Dempsey (Ret.) from the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

In this post, I want to summarize their testimonies and then give my own thoughts.

Jendayi Frazier
She outlined the four elements of US policy in Somalia. 1.To encourage political dialogue to move toward transitional elections, 2. Development and humanitarian aid, 3. To facilitate the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and 4. Deny terrorists sanctuary.
She noted that Eritrea is fomenting instability region-wide and does not have bilateral relations with the US. Also, the current border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia may expand into outright hostilities.
She made mention of the key role played by Djibouti in terms of US interests and that it is likely to become a regional transshipment hub.
And that aid has been given to Somaliland to help conduct elections.

Katherine Almquist
Outlined US regional goals as promoting stability, combating terrorism, advancing democracy, and economic development while addressing humanitarian needs. She mentioned USAID aid efforts in Ethiopia, the absence of USAID in Eritrea by that governments request and the limited operations in Somalia.

Theresa Whalen
Noted the Department of Defense's interests in region: elimination of terrorist safe havens, prevention of arms and human trafficking, and ensuring access to land and sea lanes of communication. Key effort is theatre security cooperation, which is extensive with Ethiopia, non-existent with Eritrea, and limited with Somalia.

The non-government officials set out their own analyses of the region concerned primarily with their areas of expertise. As such, Dr. David Shinn noted that Al-Shabaab, the Islamist Al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia were gaining strength, Lynn Fredericksson spoke about the human rights violations in the region, the dearth of human rights concern in US Africa policy making, and the need for human rights to play a central role in US diplomacy. Col. Dempsey spoke about the need to foster cooperation between the military, foreign intelligence, and law enforcement communities in Africa in order to combat terrorists. Military options alone he argued will not enjoy success in the long run.

From all of the panelists I got the feeling that they were informed and knew what they wanted to do in the region but there is a wide gulf between what they want and the ability for their recommendations to actually come to fruition. The US can talk about Somalia as much as it wants but the problems run so deep that without addressing the root causes the aid targeting the symptoms will be largely unsuccessful. To achieve any gains in the realm of stability, governance, and development, security is the number one priority. Without it nothing permanent can be achieved. For security to be achieved, however, a massive military presence is necessary, one which no capable country is at present willing to undertake. The US military is not going back to Somalia, and it is disconcerting that the State department believes first that all 8,000 AMISOM troops will ever arrive and second that even if they do that such a small number will be able to affect change. Especially when their arrival is supposed to lead to the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. So in regards to Somalia, I think its great that the US wants to aid its development but it is wasted effort without security.

Regarding Eritrea, the country is stirring a great deal of trouble by supporting opposition groups in Somalia and Ethiopia. It has essentially snubbed its nose at the UN and kicked out the UNMEE (UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea) peacekeepers. If events continue apace hostilities may once again breakout with Ethiopia.

As for Ethiopia, it seems that the US is very vested and very hopeful about the direction the country is taking. The US is helping out with the military, sees progress in democratic reform, and has taken a soft line in regards to human rights violations. Ethiopia is where long term US policy in the region depends.

As for the non government officials, I don't think Dr. Shinn added much that wasn't already said. Lynn Fredericksson is obviously concerned about human rights, and I believe her assessments that human rights violations in the region are very common and that they are not considered in US policy making are both correct. However, I also think that if not irrelevant, they are not central to US policy and will continue to be sidelined as other primary interests are taken into account. As for Col. Dempsey, I agree with him that targeted hits on terrorist leaders is not going to solve the terrorist problem in the Horn and that on the ground cooperation between military and law enforcement is necessary for effective counter terror operations. What he neglects to consider is that law enforcement is quite difficult when there are no effective laws as in Somalia. At present, there can only be military and intelligence ops. And as for his comparison to working security measures in Liberia, it is a false analogy. Just because they are African states with security problems does not mean the same measures will succeed anymore than measures in Serbia would be the same as Spain just because they are European.

Finally, one last thought. I was struck by the discussion of events in Somaliland. For those who don't know, the northern part of Somalia declared itself an independent republic in 1991 and while the rest of Somalia broke down, it has been largely successful especially since it was never recognized and receives little outside support. Somaliland has often been used as an example for possible solutions to the rest of Somalia. I just found it interesting that while the US does not recognize Somaliland, it does engage with it as a separate entity.

Ongoing violence in Angola and Somalia, Upcoming fighting in the Comoros

This post will focus on two instances of fighting last week that did not garner much attention in the news but which I would like to pay some attention and give background. I will also focus on a brewing battle in the Comoros.

Angola

Last week, the BBC reported an ambush in the Cabinda enclave of Angola that killed three government soldiers and a foreign oil worker. One has to look very closely at a map of the lower half of the Gulf of Guinea in southwest Africa, to notice this small area on the Atlantic coast. Due to Belgian demands at the Berlin Conference of 1885, which drew the colonial borders of Africa, the Belgian Congo, now the DRC, was given a 25 mile long Atlantic coastline at the mouth of the Congo river, thereby splitting the two Portuguese colonies of Cabinda and Angola. The two remained separate until 1960 when unified colonial rule was instituted. However, at the time of Angolan independence in 1975, Cabinda declared itself separate under the control of FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave) but the ruling government in Angola invaded and took over, incorporating Cabinda into the Angola state. The FLEC then mounted a campaign for independence that finally ended after 30 years in 2005 with the signing of a peace treaty and the granting of special status to Cabinda within Angola. One faction of the FLEC, however, did not sign the accord, still seeks independence, and remains in the bush.

Why is any of this important? Because most of Angola's crude oil come from Cabinda's offshore deposits. This oil is the key to the Angolan economy and thus Angola has an obvious interest in keeping Cabinda part of Angola. The remaining FLEC fighters are unlikely to ever achieve their goal of independence especially now that 80-90% of its fighters have either joined the Angolan army or demobilized. Nevertheless, the holdout faction of the FLEC still poses a threat to Angola's oil infrastructure which could have a negative impact on Angola's export of oil and world oil prices. Just something to keep in mind.

Somalia

Also last week, an attack on a government checkpoint by Islamists highlights the fact that Somalia's security situation is still a nightmare. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) exercises little control over a country where the predominant governing conditions are anarchic. The Islamic Courts Union which was ousted from power by the Ethiopians in December 2006, was not destroyed and still has a presence in the country. The government is also opposed by rival clans, a perpetual stumbling block to bringing order. On the government side, are Ethiopian troops who are still in country and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) which after a year has only 2,400 of 8,000 planned troops and is limited operationally to small areas of Mogadishu. Since January 2007, it has been reported that 700,000 people have fled Mogadishu. It is hoped that as more AU troops arrive, the Ethiopians will leave but the likelihood of more troops coming is not high. Further, given the limited capabilities of an AU mission, it is unclear if they would be able to strengthen the TFG anyway. That being said, the prospects for Somalia do not look good for the near term. The TFG is horribly weak and will likely stay that way without massive international help, which given the slew of other problems in Africa garnering international opinion, namely Darfur, is not likely to materialize.

The Comoros

Now I'm sure most of you have never even heard of the Comoros, let alone keep up with developments in the island nation. So for your benefit and for mine, I will give the background and a recap of events. The Comoros are a group of islands at the northern mouth of the Mozambique channel off Africa's southeast coast two thirds of the way between Madagascar and Mozambique. Since independence from France in 1975, it has experienced 19 coups. Since 2000, the three main islands (Grand Comore, Moheli and Anjouan) each have their own local government as well as a federal presidency which rotates among the three.

The current problems stem initially from President Muhamad Bacar of Anjouan's refusal to work with the Union presidency and as of last June, he held his own elections on the island, printing his own ballots, contrary to what the rest of the country was doing. All diplomatic efforts to solve the situation have thus far failed and as of this week an AU force consisting of 1,700 troops from Tanzania, Sudan, and Senegal with logistical support from Libya was dispatched to the area by French transport to prepare for an amphibious assault on the island. Today, the VOA is reporting a raid on Anjouan that captured three of Bacar's soldiers. Stay tuned to see how developments play out.