Evaluating US Policy Options on the Horn of Africa

On Tuesday, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on Evaluating US Policy Options on the Horn of Africa. Two panels testified; the first consisting of government officials, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Jendayi Frazier, assistant administrator for Africa at USAID, Katherine Almquist, and deputy assistant secretary of defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whalen. The second panel was non-government officials: Dr. David Shinn, adjunct professor at GWU, Lynn Fredericksson, advocacy director for Africa at Amnesty International, and Col. Thomas Dempsey (Ret.) from the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

In this post, I want to summarize their testimonies and then give my own thoughts.

Jendayi Frazier
She outlined the four elements of US policy in Somalia. 1.To encourage political dialogue to move toward transitional elections, 2. Development and humanitarian aid, 3. To facilitate the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and 4. Deny terrorists sanctuary.
She noted that Eritrea is fomenting instability region-wide and does not have bilateral relations with the US. Also, the current border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia may expand into outright hostilities.
She made mention of the key role played by Djibouti in terms of US interests and that it is likely to become a regional transshipment hub.
And that aid has been given to Somaliland to help conduct elections.

Katherine Almquist
Outlined US regional goals as promoting stability, combating terrorism, advancing democracy, and economic development while addressing humanitarian needs. She mentioned USAID aid efforts in Ethiopia, the absence of USAID in Eritrea by that governments request and the limited operations in Somalia.

Theresa Whalen
Noted the Department of Defense's interests in region: elimination of terrorist safe havens, prevention of arms and human trafficking, and ensuring access to land and sea lanes of communication. Key effort is theatre security cooperation, which is extensive with Ethiopia, non-existent with Eritrea, and limited with Somalia.

The non-government officials set out their own analyses of the region concerned primarily with their areas of expertise. As such, Dr. David Shinn noted that Al-Shabaab, the Islamist Al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia were gaining strength, Lynn Fredericksson spoke about the human rights violations in the region, the dearth of human rights concern in US Africa policy making, and the need for human rights to play a central role in US diplomacy. Col. Dempsey spoke about the need to foster cooperation between the military, foreign intelligence, and law enforcement communities in Africa in order to combat terrorists. Military options alone he argued will not enjoy success in the long run.

From all of the panelists I got the feeling that they were informed and knew what they wanted to do in the region but there is a wide gulf between what they want and the ability for their recommendations to actually come to fruition. The US can talk about Somalia as much as it wants but the problems run so deep that without addressing the root causes the aid targeting the symptoms will be largely unsuccessful. To achieve any gains in the realm of stability, governance, and development, security is the number one priority. Without it nothing permanent can be achieved. For security to be achieved, however, a massive military presence is necessary, one which no capable country is at present willing to undertake. The US military is not going back to Somalia, and it is disconcerting that the State department believes first that all 8,000 AMISOM troops will ever arrive and second that even if they do that such a small number will be able to affect change. Especially when their arrival is supposed to lead to the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. So in regards to Somalia, I think its great that the US wants to aid its development but it is wasted effort without security.

Regarding Eritrea, the country is stirring a great deal of trouble by supporting opposition groups in Somalia and Ethiopia. It has essentially snubbed its nose at the UN and kicked out the UNMEE (UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea) peacekeepers. If events continue apace hostilities may once again breakout with Ethiopia.

As for Ethiopia, it seems that the US is very vested and very hopeful about the direction the country is taking. The US is helping out with the military, sees progress in democratic reform, and has taken a soft line in regards to human rights violations. Ethiopia is where long term US policy in the region depends.

As for the non government officials, I don't think Dr. Shinn added much that wasn't already said. Lynn Fredericksson is obviously concerned about human rights, and I believe her assessments that human rights violations in the region are very common and that they are not considered in US policy making are both correct. However, I also think that if not irrelevant, they are not central to US policy and will continue to be sidelined as other primary interests are taken into account. As for Col. Dempsey, I agree with him that targeted hits on terrorist leaders is not going to solve the terrorist problem in the Horn and that on the ground cooperation between military and law enforcement is necessary for effective counter terror operations. What he neglects to consider is that law enforcement is quite difficult when there are no effective laws as in Somalia. At present, there can only be military and intelligence ops. And as for his comparison to working security measures in Liberia, it is a false analogy. Just because they are African states with security problems does not mean the same measures will succeed anymore than measures in Serbia would be the same as Spain just because they are European.

Finally, one last thought. I was struck by the discussion of events in Somaliland. For those who don't know, the northern part of Somalia declared itself an independent republic in 1991 and while the rest of Somalia broke down, it has been largely successful especially since it was never recognized and receives little outside support. Somaliland has often been used as an example for possible solutions to the rest of Somalia. I just found it interesting that while the US does not recognize Somaliland, it does engage with it as a separate entity.

Ongoing violence in Angola and Somalia, Upcoming fighting in the Comoros

This post will focus on two instances of fighting last week that did not garner much attention in the news but which I would like to pay some attention and give background. I will also focus on a brewing battle in the Comoros.

Angola

Last week, the BBC reported an ambush in the Cabinda enclave of Angola that killed three government soldiers and a foreign oil worker. One has to look very closely at a map of the lower half of the Gulf of Guinea in southwest Africa, to notice this small area on the Atlantic coast. Due to Belgian demands at the Berlin Conference of 1885, which drew the colonial borders of Africa, the Belgian Congo, now the DRC, was given a 25 mile long Atlantic coastline at the mouth of the Congo river, thereby splitting the two Portuguese colonies of Cabinda and Angola. The two remained separate until 1960 when unified colonial rule was instituted. However, at the time of Angolan independence in 1975, Cabinda declared itself separate under the control of FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave) but the ruling government in Angola invaded and took over, incorporating Cabinda into the Angola state. The FLEC then mounted a campaign for independence that finally ended after 30 years in 2005 with the signing of a peace treaty and the granting of special status to Cabinda within Angola. One faction of the FLEC, however, did not sign the accord, still seeks independence, and remains in the bush.

Why is any of this important? Because most of Angola's crude oil come from Cabinda's offshore deposits. This oil is the key to the Angolan economy and thus Angola has an obvious interest in keeping Cabinda part of Angola. The remaining FLEC fighters are unlikely to ever achieve their goal of independence especially now that 80-90% of its fighters have either joined the Angolan army or demobilized. Nevertheless, the holdout faction of the FLEC still poses a threat to Angola's oil infrastructure which could have a negative impact on Angola's export of oil and world oil prices. Just something to keep in mind.

Somalia

Also last week, an attack on a government checkpoint by Islamists highlights the fact that Somalia's security situation is still a nightmare. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) exercises little control over a country where the predominant governing conditions are anarchic. The Islamic Courts Union which was ousted from power by the Ethiopians in December 2006, was not destroyed and still has a presence in the country. The government is also opposed by rival clans, a perpetual stumbling block to bringing order. On the government side, are Ethiopian troops who are still in country and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) which after a year has only 2,400 of 8,000 planned troops and is limited operationally to small areas of Mogadishu. Since January 2007, it has been reported that 700,000 people have fled Mogadishu. It is hoped that as more AU troops arrive, the Ethiopians will leave but the likelihood of more troops coming is not high. Further, given the limited capabilities of an AU mission, it is unclear if they would be able to strengthen the TFG anyway. That being said, the prospects for Somalia do not look good for the near term. The TFG is horribly weak and will likely stay that way without massive international help, which given the slew of other problems in Africa garnering international opinion, namely Darfur, is not likely to materialize.

The Comoros

Now I'm sure most of you have never even heard of the Comoros, let alone keep up with developments in the island nation. So for your benefit and for mine, I will give the background and a recap of events. The Comoros are a group of islands at the northern mouth of the Mozambique channel off Africa's southeast coast two thirds of the way between Madagascar and Mozambique. Since independence from France in 1975, it has experienced 19 coups. Since 2000, the three main islands (Grand Comore, Moheli and Anjouan) each have their own local government as well as a federal presidency which rotates among the three.

The current problems stem initially from President Muhamad Bacar of Anjouan's refusal to work with the Union presidency and as of last June, he held his own elections on the island, printing his own ballots, contrary to what the rest of the country was doing. All diplomatic efforts to solve the situation have thus far failed and as of this week an AU force consisting of 1,700 troops from Tanzania, Sudan, and Senegal with logistical support from Libya was dispatched to the area by French transport to prepare for an amphibious assault on the island. Today, the VOA is reporting a raid on Anjouan that captured three of Bacar's soldiers. Stay tuned to see how developments play out.

Sudan is becoming a flashpoint

But first a quick mention of the US missile attack on Dhoobley, Somalia on the Kenya-Somalia border in an attempt to kill an Al Qaeda operative there. The target, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, is suspected of coordinating Al Qaeda operations in East Africa and planning the suicide bombing on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya and the simultaneous attempt to down an Arkia Israel airplane leaving Mombasa on November 28, 2002. The missile was launched from a US Navy submarine off the coast. I don't know if the sub was operating under AFRICOM but it nevertheless shows that the US is ready, willing, and able to take military action on the continent, in this instance against Islamic terrorists.

And now to Sudan.

In the past few days, Sudan has been in the news regarding ostensibly unconnected events within the country. First, attacks on civilians in Darfur by the Sudanese military and Janjaweed militiamen have continued. Second, fighting has begun to break out in Abyei on the border between North and South Sudan. Over the weekend, Nicholas Kristof wrote an opinion piece about 'Africa's next slaughter' if war were to break out there and posted a video of his trip to the region. Today, a skirmish was reported between the French-led EUFOR mission based in Chad and Sudanese troops on the border, after EUFOR troops accidentally drove into Sudan.

From the outside, these events may seem unrelated or at least the events in Darfur and in Abyei. The fact of the matter is that they are very much connected. The link is the Arab led central government in Khartoum. The Arabs who are muslim have been fighting the christian and animist black Africans in the South for 30 years. The fighting ended with a peace treaty in January 2005. The terms of that agreement, however, have not been fulfilled and now, as Kristof describes, the two sides are poised to resume hostilities. At issue, particularly, is control over the oil in the region. The government wants access to the oil in former rebel controlled areas. As I discussed in a previous post, there does not seem to be a peaceable way out of this potential conflict as long as the Sudanese government maintains its intransigence and unwillingness to compromise with the southerners. A second aspect is the hatred the Arab Sudanese maintain for the Southern blacks. The fighting has always had ethnic overtones and its resumption will be no different.

Does that sound familiar to any other ongoing fighting in Sudan? Of course. The same hatred of ethnic non-Arabs that is present in the South, is driving the ethnic cleansing in Darfur. I don't think it is necessary to go into the whole Darfur history but I wanted to draw the connection between fighting black Africans in the South and in Darfur.

Now to bring it all together. Sudan wants freedom of action within its own territory and therefore, the government has consistently opposed international pressure to stop the killing as well as blocked the deployment of large-scale UN and AU peacekeeping missions in Sudan. As such, it is clearly unhappy with the deployment of the EUFOR mission on the Chad-Sudan border and today's skirmish sets the tone for Sudan's attitude and future reactions toward EUFOR. How can the government survive the international pressure? Through the protection of China which is the number one customer of Sudanese oil.

So to recap. Sudan's Arab government is continuing attacks on non-Arabs in Darfur and is potentially restarting fighting in the Abyei region of the South. Attacks against international peacekeepers operating out of Chad are a reflection of Sudanese animosity towards international efforts to intervene in Sudan. Sudan can afford to do so because of the oil it sells to China, some of which is at stake in the fighting in the South.