Thursday, May 8, 2008
Recap of ASMEA Conference
This is a link to the ASMEA Conference highlights. Two videos are on the page, the first is the keynote address by Prof. Bernard Lewis and the second is the video from the roundtable discussion on current instability in Africa.
Thursday, April 24, 2008
ASMEA Conference
For all those in Washington, DC this is a public service announcement. Tomorrow and Saturday, April 25 and 26, ASMEA (The Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa) will be holding its annual conference at the Marriot Wardman Park Hotel with a keynote speech being delivered by Prof. Bernard Lewis at 1230 PM on Saturday. The conference is titled "The Evolution of Islamic Politics, Philosophy, and Culture in the Middle East and Africa: From Traditional Limits to Modern Extremes," and will feature panels and roundtable discussions with leading scholars in the field. For more information please check out the ASMEA website. Also, as long as your on the website, please read the book review I wrote on Nicholas Shaxson's "Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil."
Monday, April 14, 2008
The Ponant is Freed
On Friday, the ordeal of the French yacht, Ponant, which had been hijacked by Somali pirates, was resolved. In last week's post, I speculated that the end would come either with paying ransom or military action. As it turned out, both happened. The details have not been confirmed but as far as I can tell from various news reports, the owners of the yacht, CMA-CGM, paid a ransom of $2 million dollars for the release of the 30 man crew who were brought safely ashore. The pirates then attempted to flee the area in three pickup trucks but were tracked by French attack helicopters. One car was disabled by a sniper shot and the 6 pirates inside were captured by French commandos. The video can be seen here. In addition to capturing 6 of the 12 pirates, the French armed forces chief of staff, Gen. Jean-Louis Georgelin said that some of the ransom money was recovered as well. The pirates have been taken into French custody and the French government has asked the Somalis for permission to extradite them back to France.
A couple questions to think about. One, why couldn't the French commandos capture all of the pirates. With 2 boats, 4 or 5 helicopters and 50 commandos, why was only one car disabled? And why, as it seems, did they have to be captured and not killed outright? Gen. Georgelin said in a press conference that "No shots were fired directly at the pirates"? I understated the need to avoid collateral damage, but if the sniper could hit the engine of a moving car, the pirates could have been hit too.
Second, what effect will this have as a deterrence measure? If half of the pirates got away with some of the money, the incentive may still exist to continue their hijacking ways, especially if the pirates are smarter about the nationality of the vessels they attack. That is to say, stay away from vessels belonging to countries with commando teams that can deploy to the region.
Third, was the operation coordinated between the French charter company and the French government, or did the company expect to pay the money for the crew and the ship, and the military acted independently. Obviously, it seems that avoiding casualties among the crew was the overriding factor, so I am not clear on exactly what the French commando mission was about. Were they trying to capture the pirates to bring them to justice, perhaps recover some of the ransom, or make a show of force to prevent a future incident?
A couple questions to think about. One, why couldn't the French commandos capture all of the pirates. With 2 boats, 4 or 5 helicopters and 50 commandos, why was only one car disabled? And why, as it seems, did they have to be captured and not killed outright? Gen. Georgelin said in a press conference that "No shots were fired directly at the pirates"? I understated the need to avoid collateral damage, but if the sniper could hit the engine of a moving car, the pirates could have been hit too.
Second, what effect will this have as a deterrence measure? If half of the pirates got away with some of the money, the incentive may still exist to continue their hijacking ways, especially if the pirates are smarter about the nationality of the vessels they attack. That is to say, stay away from vessels belonging to countries with commando teams that can deploy to the region.
Third, was the operation coordinated between the French charter company and the French government, or did the company expect to pay the money for the crew and the ship, and the military acted independently. Obviously, it seems that avoiding casualties among the crew was the overriding factor, so I am not clear on exactly what the French commando mission was about. Were they trying to capture the pirates to bring them to justice, perhaps recover some of the ransom, or make a show of force to prevent a future incident?
Monday, April 7, 2008
Piracy off Somalia
The focus of parties interested in African security on violent conflict and international terrrorism can often relegate other important issues, such as piracy and narcotics, to the policy and scholarship periphery. The recent hijacking of a French yacht off the coast of Somalia has once again brought attention to the problem of piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa and I wish to address the topic today.
On Friday, the Ponant, a luxury French yacht with a crew of 32 and no passengers was seized in the Gulf of Aden by Somali pirates and is now anchored off Puntland in northeastern Somalia. The vessel is being monitored by a French naval frigate in the the Indian ocean on NATO duties as well as French aircraft based in nearby Djibouti. The situation will likely be resolved in one of two ways, either a ransom will be paid or military action will be taken to free the crew and the ship.
This incident is not a rare occurence. The Somali coastal waters are considered to be among the most hazardous in the world and the International Maritime Bureau advises merchant ships to stay at least 200 nautical miles offshore. In 2007, more than 25 ships were seized in the region despite a multinational naval force that patrols the area. In February, a Danish-owned tug was released after paying a ransom of $700,000. An act condemned by the Somali government because it would only encourage further piracy.
The problem stems from a combination of complete lawlessness, an absence of economic opportunities in Somalia, and geography. Since the outbreak of civil war 18 years ago, Somalia has been torn by anarchy, famine, drought, and clan-based warlords. The Somali central government exercises little control over the country, has no effective domestic law enforcement, let alone a functioning navy. It is therefore unsurprising that few options exist for men seeking to feed their families. A large part of the population is dependent on United Nations World Food Programme food aid. Taken together with the Somalia's strategic position; 3,300 km of coastline bordering the Indian ocean approaches to Kenya and the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez canal, the major trade route between Asia and Europe, it is understandable why the area cannot by bypassed and why piracy has become a popular method to make a living.
Beginning with a spike of incidents in 2005, (34 up from 1 the year before) Somalia quickly became one of the world's most dangerous areas for merchant vessels. Pirates in speed boats armed with AK-47's and RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), attacked a cruise ship, lured smaller vessels by shooting flares and making distress calls, and attacked ships carrying United Nations food aid. In response, a multinational naval task force was set up to monitor and deter pirates but despite the efforts, the problem continues.
International law (a favorite topic of mine) has also gotten in the way. Legally, the naval task force has no standing once ships enter Somali territorial waters, for example, ships delivering aid. Normally, the national government is responsible for protecting shipping in territorial waters but Somalia has neither the resources nor the infrastructure to combat the pirates, who by default enjoy free reign. Thus, ransom has become the solution for freeing hijacked vessels and will likely continue to be the primary method until such a time as the Somali government can stop the piracy on its own. I suspect that there will be an increase in naval patrols by NATO and other concerned states but until the pirates' bases are removed on land, they will freely operate at sea.
As for the Ponant, French counter-terrrorism and hostage rescue teams are standing by in Djibouti should they be called on but even if they are, few other countries have the capabilities to provide such forces in the event that they are needed and should not be viewed as a viable long term solution.
Wednesday, April 2, 2008
The Comoros
Back from an extended hiatus, I wish to discuss last week's events in the Comoros.
The conflict in the Indian Ocean nation of the Comoros has now come to a resolution. After a brief fight following the seaborne landing of 600 Comoran and 1,500 AU troops from Tanzania, Senegal, Libya, and Sudan last Tuesday March 25, the Comoran federal government now has retaken control of Anjouan island which had been under the control of rebel president, Mohamed Bacar. Bacar escaped to the nearby French island of Mayotte and from there was taken by French military plane to Reunion. The Comoran government has requested the extradition of Bacar back to the Comoros to stand trial and has announced that elections will be held within three months for a new island president. The Comoros three main islands Grand Comore, Moheli, and Anjouan each have their own president who then rotate as head of the federal government. Hopefully, this will mark a new beginning for the Comoros which since independence in 1975 has experienced over 20 coups.
A number of lessons to take away from this episode. First, the threat of a renegade leader in a weak state is particularly acute and in many cases cannot be solved without international intervention as was the case in the Comoros. Without external support, Bacar would not have been deposed. Second, though efforts in Sudan have largely failed to get off the ground and the AU force in Somalia is too small to undertake serious operations, in the future AU forces may be able to conduct small scale operations similar to the Comoros. The Comoros operation should be a boost to the AU as an organization able to successfully coordinate and deploy multinational forces. Finally, it will be interesting to see what France does with Bacar. The French government should extradite him back to the Comoros to stand trial but if they don't I can't say I will be surprised. It would be just another incident of the French meddling in the affairs of a former colony.
The conflict in the Indian Ocean nation of the Comoros has now come to a resolution. After a brief fight following the seaborne landing of 600 Comoran and 1,500 AU troops from Tanzania, Senegal, Libya, and Sudan last Tuesday March 25, the Comoran federal government now has retaken control of Anjouan island which had been under the control of rebel president, Mohamed Bacar. Bacar escaped to the nearby French island of Mayotte and from there was taken by French military plane to Reunion. The Comoran government has requested the extradition of Bacar back to the Comoros to stand trial and has announced that elections will be held within three months for a new island president. The Comoros three main islands Grand Comore, Moheli, and Anjouan each have their own president who then rotate as head of the federal government. Hopefully, this will mark a new beginning for the Comoros which since independence in 1975 has experienced over 20 coups.
A number of lessons to take away from this episode. First, the threat of a renegade leader in a weak state is particularly acute and in many cases cannot be solved without international intervention as was the case in the Comoros. Without external support, Bacar would not have been deposed. Second, though efforts in Sudan have largely failed to get off the ground and the AU force in Somalia is too small to undertake serious operations, in the future AU forces may be able to conduct small scale operations similar to the Comoros. The Comoros operation should be a boost to the AU as an organization able to successfully coordinate and deploy multinational forces. Finally, it will be interesting to see what France does with Bacar. The French government should extradite him back to the Comoros to stand trial but if they don't I can't say I will be surprised. It would be just another incident of the French meddling in the affairs of a former colony.
Thursday, March 13, 2008
Evaluating US Policy Options on the Horn of Africa
On Tuesday, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on Evaluating US Policy Options on the Horn of Africa. Two panels testified; the first consisting of government officials, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Jendayi Frazier, assistant administrator for Africa at USAID, Katherine Almquist, and deputy assistant secretary of defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whalen. The second panel was non-government officials: Dr. David Shinn, adjunct professor at GWU, Lynn Fredericksson, advocacy director for Africa at Amnesty International, and Col. Thomas Dempsey (Ret.) from the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
In this post, I want to summarize their testimonies and then give my own thoughts.
Jendayi Frazier
She outlined the four elements of US policy in Somalia. 1.To encourage political dialogue to move toward transitional elections, 2. Development and humanitarian aid, 3. To facilitate the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and 4. Deny terrorists sanctuary.
She noted that Eritrea is fomenting instability region-wide and does not have bilateral relations with the US. Also, the current border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia may expand into outright hostilities.
She made mention of the key role played by Djibouti in terms of US interests and that it is likely to become a regional transshipment hub.
And that aid has been given to Somaliland to help conduct elections.
Katherine Almquist
Outlined US regional goals as promoting stability, combating terrorism, advancing democracy, and economic development while addressing humanitarian needs. She mentioned USAID aid efforts in Ethiopia, the absence of USAID in Eritrea by that governments request and the limited operations in Somalia.
Theresa Whalen
Noted the Department of Defense's interests in region: elimination of terrorist safe havens, prevention of arms and human trafficking, and ensuring access to land and sea lanes of communication. Key effort is theatre security cooperation, which is extensive with Ethiopia, non-existent with Eritrea, and limited with Somalia.
The non-government officials set out their own analyses of the region concerned primarily with their areas of expertise. As such, Dr. David Shinn noted that Al-Shabaab, the Islamist Al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia were gaining strength, Lynn Fredericksson spoke about the human rights violations in the region, the dearth of human rights concern in US Africa policy making, and the need for human rights to play a central role in US diplomacy. Col. Dempsey spoke about the need to foster cooperation between the military, foreign intelligence, and law enforcement communities in Africa in order to combat terrorists. Military options alone he argued will not enjoy success in the long run.
From all of the panelists I got the feeling that they were informed and knew what they wanted to do in the region but there is a wide gulf between what they want and the ability for their recommendations to actually come to fruition. The US can talk about Somalia as much as it wants but the problems run so deep that without addressing the root causes the aid targeting the symptoms will be largely unsuccessful. To achieve any gains in the realm of stability, governance, and development, security is the number one priority. Without it nothing permanent can be achieved. For security to be achieved, however, a massive military presence is necessary, one which no capable country is at present willing to undertake. The US military is not going back to Somalia, and it is disconcerting that the State department believes first that all 8,000 AMISOM troops will ever arrive and second that even if they do that such a small number will be able to affect change. Especially when their arrival is supposed to lead to the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. So in regards to Somalia, I think its great that the US wants to aid its development but it is wasted effort without security.
Regarding Eritrea, the country is stirring a great deal of trouble by supporting opposition groups in Somalia and Ethiopia. It has essentially snubbed its nose at the UN and kicked out the UNMEE (UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea) peacekeepers. If events continue apace hostilities may once again breakout with Ethiopia.
As for Ethiopia, it seems that the US is very vested and very hopeful about the direction the country is taking. The US is helping out with the military, sees progress in democratic reform, and has taken a soft line in regards to human rights violations. Ethiopia is where long term US policy in the region depends.
As for the non government officials, I don't think Dr. Shinn added much that wasn't already said. Lynn Fredericksson is obviously concerned about human rights, and I believe her assessments that human rights violations in the region are very common and that they are not considered in US policy making are both correct. However, I also think that if not irrelevant, they are not central to US policy and will continue to be sidelined as other primary interests are taken into account. As for Col. Dempsey, I agree with him that targeted hits on terrorist leaders is not going to solve the terrorist problem in the Horn and that on the ground cooperation between military and law enforcement is necessary for effective counter terror operations. What he neglects to consider is that law enforcement is quite difficult when there are no effective laws as in Somalia. At present, there can only be military and intelligence ops. And as for his comparison to working security measures in Liberia, it is a false analogy. Just because they are African states with security problems does not mean the same measures will succeed anymore than measures in Serbia would be the same as Spain just because they are European.
Finally, one last thought. I was struck by the discussion of events in Somaliland. For those who don't know, the northern part of Somalia declared itself an independent republic in 1991 and while the rest of Somalia broke down, it has been largely successful especially since it was never recognized and receives little outside support. Somaliland has often been used as an example for possible solutions to the rest of Somalia. I just found it interesting that while the US does not recognize Somaliland, it does engage with it as a separate entity.
In this post, I want to summarize their testimonies and then give my own thoughts.
Jendayi Frazier
She outlined the four elements of US policy in Somalia. 1.To encourage political dialogue to move toward transitional elections, 2. Development and humanitarian aid, 3. To facilitate the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and 4. Deny terrorists sanctuary.
She noted that Eritrea is fomenting instability region-wide and does not have bilateral relations with the US. Also, the current border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia may expand into outright hostilities.
She made mention of the key role played by Djibouti in terms of US interests and that it is likely to become a regional transshipment hub.
And that aid has been given to Somaliland to help conduct elections.
Katherine Almquist
Outlined US regional goals as promoting stability, combating terrorism, advancing democracy, and economic development while addressing humanitarian needs. She mentioned USAID aid efforts in Ethiopia, the absence of USAID in Eritrea by that governments request and the limited operations in Somalia.
Theresa Whalen
Noted the Department of Defense's interests in region: elimination of terrorist safe havens, prevention of arms and human trafficking, and ensuring access to land and sea lanes of communication. Key effort is theatre security cooperation, which is extensive with Ethiopia, non-existent with Eritrea, and limited with Somalia.
The non-government officials set out their own analyses of the region concerned primarily with their areas of expertise. As such, Dr. David Shinn noted that Al-Shabaab, the Islamist Al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia were gaining strength, Lynn Fredericksson spoke about the human rights violations in the region, the dearth of human rights concern in US Africa policy making, and the need for human rights to play a central role in US diplomacy. Col. Dempsey spoke about the need to foster cooperation between the military, foreign intelligence, and law enforcement communities in Africa in order to combat terrorists. Military options alone he argued will not enjoy success in the long run.
From all of the panelists I got the feeling that they were informed and knew what they wanted to do in the region but there is a wide gulf between what they want and the ability for their recommendations to actually come to fruition. The US can talk about Somalia as much as it wants but the problems run so deep that without addressing the root causes the aid targeting the symptoms will be largely unsuccessful. To achieve any gains in the realm of stability, governance, and development, security is the number one priority. Without it nothing permanent can be achieved. For security to be achieved, however, a massive military presence is necessary, one which no capable country is at present willing to undertake. The US military is not going back to Somalia, and it is disconcerting that the State department believes first that all 8,000 AMISOM troops will ever arrive and second that even if they do that such a small number will be able to affect change. Especially when their arrival is supposed to lead to the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. So in regards to Somalia, I think its great that the US wants to aid its development but it is wasted effort without security.
Regarding Eritrea, the country is stirring a great deal of trouble by supporting opposition groups in Somalia and Ethiopia. It has essentially snubbed its nose at the UN and kicked out the UNMEE (UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea) peacekeepers. If events continue apace hostilities may once again breakout with Ethiopia.
As for Ethiopia, it seems that the US is very vested and very hopeful about the direction the country is taking. The US is helping out with the military, sees progress in democratic reform, and has taken a soft line in regards to human rights violations. Ethiopia is where long term US policy in the region depends.
As for the non government officials, I don't think Dr. Shinn added much that wasn't already said. Lynn Fredericksson is obviously concerned about human rights, and I believe her assessments that human rights violations in the region are very common and that they are not considered in US policy making are both correct. However, I also think that if not irrelevant, they are not central to US policy and will continue to be sidelined as other primary interests are taken into account. As for Col. Dempsey, I agree with him that targeted hits on terrorist leaders is not going to solve the terrorist problem in the Horn and that on the ground cooperation between military and law enforcement is necessary for effective counter terror operations. What he neglects to consider is that law enforcement is quite difficult when there are no effective laws as in Somalia. At present, there can only be military and intelligence ops. And as for his comparison to working security measures in Liberia, it is a false analogy. Just because they are African states with security problems does not mean the same measures will succeed anymore than measures in Serbia would be the same as Spain just because they are European.
Finally, one last thought. I was struck by the discussion of events in Somaliland. For those who don't know, the northern part of Somalia declared itself an independent republic in 1991 and while the rest of Somalia broke down, it has been largely successful especially since it was never recognized and receives little outside support. Somaliland has often been used as an example for possible solutions to the rest of Somalia. I just found it interesting that while the US does not recognize Somaliland, it does engage with it as a separate entity.
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
Ongoing violence in Angola and Somalia, Upcoming fighting in the Comoros
This post will focus on two instances of fighting last week that did not garner much attention in the news but which I would like to pay some attention and give background. I will also focus on a brewing battle in the Comoros.
Angola
Last week, the BBC reported an ambush in the Cabinda enclave of Angola that killed three government soldiers and a foreign oil worker. One has to look very closely at a map of the lower half of the Gulf of Guinea in southwest Africa, to notice this small area on the Atlantic coast. Due to Belgian demands at the Berlin Conference of 1885, which drew the colonial borders of Africa, the Belgian Congo, now the DRC, was given a 25 mile long Atlantic coastline at the mouth of the Congo river, thereby splitting the two Portuguese colonies of Cabinda and Angola. The two remained separate until 1960 when unified colonial rule was instituted. However, at the time of Angolan independence in 1975, Cabinda declared itself separate under the control of FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave) but the ruling government in Angola invaded and took over, incorporating Cabinda into the Angola state. The FLEC then mounted a campaign for independence that finally ended after 30 years in 2005 with the signing of a peace treaty and the granting of special status to Cabinda within Angola. One faction of the FLEC, however, did not sign the accord, still seeks independence, and remains in the bush.
Why is any of this important? Because most of Angola's crude oil come from Cabinda's offshore deposits. This oil is the key to the Angolan economy and thus Angola has an obvious interest in keeping Cabinda part of Angola. The remaining FLEC fighters are unlikely to ever achieve their goal of independence especially now that 80-90% of its fighters have either joined the Angolan army or demobilized. Nevertheless, the holdout faction of the FLEC still poses a threat to Angola's oil infrastructure which could have a negative impact on Angola's export of oil and world oil prices. Just something to keep in mind.
Somalia
Also last week, an attack on a government checkpoint by Islamists highlights the fact that Somalia's security situation is still a nightmare. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) exercises little control over a country where the predominant governing conditions are anarchic. The Islamic Courts Union which was ousted from power by the Ethiopians in December 2006, was not destroyed and still has a presence in the country. The government is also opposed by rival clans, a perpetual stumbling block to bringing order. On the government side, are Ethiopian troops who are still in country and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) which after a year has only 2,400 of 8,000 planned troops and is limited operationally to small areas of Mogadishu. Since January 2007, it has been reported that 700,000 people have fled Mogadishu. It is hoped that as more AU troops arrive, the Ethiopians will leave but the likelihood of more troops coming is not high. Further, given the limited capabilities of an AU mission, it is unclear if they would be able to strengthen the TFG anyway. That being said, the prospects for Somalia do not look good for the near term. The TFG is horribly weak and will likely stay that way without massive international help, which given the slew of other problems in Africa garnering international opinion, namely Darfur, is not likely to materialize.
The ComorosNow I'm sure most of you have never even heard of the Comoros, let alone keep up with developments in the island nation. So for your benefit and for mine, I will give the background and a recap of events. The Comoros are a group of islands at the northern mouth of the Mozambique channel off Africa's southeast coast two thirds of the way between Madagascar and Mozambique. Since independence from France in 1975, it has experienced 19 coups. Since 2000, the three main islands (Grand Comore, Moheli and Anjouan) each have their own local government as well as a federal presidency which rotates among the three.
The current problems stem initially from President Muhamad Bacar of Anjouan's refusal to work with the Union presidency and as of last June, he held his own elections on the island, printing his own ballots, contrary to what the rest of the country was doing. All diplomatic efforts to solve the situation have thus far failed and as of this week an AU force consisting of 1,700 troops from Tanzania, Sudan, and Senegal with logistical support from Libya was dispatched to the area by French transport to prepare for an amphibious assault on the island. Today, the VOA is reporting a raid on Anjouan that captured three of Bacar's soldiers. Stay tuned to see how developments play out.
Tuesday, March 4, 2008
Sudan is becoming a flashpoint
But first a quick mention of the US missile attack on Dhoobley, Somalia on the Kenya-Somalia border in an attempt to kill an Al Qaeda operative there. The target, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, is suspected of coordinating Al Qaeda operations in East Africa and planning the suicide bombing on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya and the simultaneous attempt to down an Arkia Israel airplane leaving Mombasa on November 28, 2002. The missile was launched from a US Navy submarine off the coast. I don't know if the sub was operating under AFRICOM but it nevertheless shows that the US is ready, willing, and able to take military action on the continent, in this instance against Islamic terrorists.
And now to Sudan.
In the past few days, Sudan has been in the news regarding ostensibly unconnected events within the country. First, attacks on civilians in Darfur by the Sudanese military and Janjaweed militiamen have continued. Second, fighting has begun to break out in Abyei on the border between North and South Sudan. Over the weekend, Nicholas Kristof wrote an opinion piece about 'Africa's next slaughter' if war were to break out there and posted a video of his trip to the region. Today, a skirmish was reported between the French-led EUFOR mission based in Chad and Sudanese troops on the border, after EUFOR troops accidentally drove into Sudan.
From the outside, these events may seem unrelated or at least the events in Darfur and in Abyei. The fact of the matter is that they are very much connected. The link is the Arab led central government in Khartoum. The Arabs who are muslim have been fighting the christian and animist black Africans in the South for 30 years. The fighting ended with a peace treaty in January 2005. The terms of that agreement, however, have not been fulfilled and now, as Kristof describes, the two sides are poised to resume hostilities. At issue, particularly, is control over the oil in the region. The government wants access to the oil in former rebel controlled areas. As I discussed in a previous post, there does not seem to be a peaceable way out of this potential conflict as long as the Sudanese government maintains its intransigence and unwillingness to compromise with the southerners. A second aspect is the hatred the Arab Sudanese maintain for the Southern blacks. The fighting has always had ethnic overtones and its resumption will be no different.
Does that sound familiar to any other ongoing fighting in Sudan? Of course. The same hatred of ethnic non-Arabs that is present in the South, is driving the ethnic cleansing in Darfur. I don't think it is necessary to go into the whole Darfur history but I wanted to draw the connection between fighting black Africans in the South and in Darfur.
Now to bring it all together. Sudan wants freedom of action within its own territory and therefore, the government has consistently opposed international pressure to stop the killing as well as blocked the deployment of large-scale UN and AU peacekeeping missions in Sudan. As such, it is clearly unhappy with the deployment of the EUFOR mission on the Chad-Sudan border and today's skirmish sets the tone for Sudan's attitude and future reactions toward EUFOR. How can the government survive the international pressure? Through the protection of China which is the number one customer of Sudanese oil.
So to recap. Sudan's Arab government is continuing attacks on non-Arabs in Darfur and is potentially restarting fighting in the Abyei region of the South. Attacks against international peacekeepers operating out of Chad are a reflection of Sudanese animosity towards international efforts to intervene in Sudan. Sudan can afford to do so because of the oil it sells to China, some of which is at stake in the fighting in the South.
And now to Sudan.
In the past few days, Sudan has been in the news regarding ostensibly unconnected events within the country. First, attacks on civilians in Darfur by the Sudanese military and Janjaweed militiamen have continued. Second, fighting has begun to break out in Abyei on the border between North and South Sudan. Over the weekend, Nicholas Kristof wrote an opinion piece about 'Africa's next slaughter' if war were to break out there and posted a video of his trip to the region. Today, a skirmish was reported between the French-led EUFOR mission based in Chad and Sudanese troops on the border, after EUFOR troops accidentally drove into Sudan.
From the outside, these events may seem unrelated or at least the events in Darfur and in Abyei. The fact of the matter is that they are very much connected. The link is the Arab led central government in Khartoum. The Arabs who are muslim have been fighting the christian and animist black Africans in the South for 30 years. The fighting ended with a peace treaty in January 2005. The terms of that agreement, however, have not been fulfilled and now, as Kristof describes, the two sides are poised to resume hostilities. At issue, particularly, is control over the oil in the region. The government wants access to the oil in former rebel controlled areas. As I discussed in a previous post, there does not seem to be a peaceable way out of this potential conflict as long as the Sudanese government maintains its intransigence and unwillingness to compromise with the southerners. A second aspect is the hatred the Arab Sudanese maintain for the Southern blacks. The fighting has always had ethnic overtones and its resumption will be no different.
Does that sound familiar to any other ongoing fighting in Sudan? Of course. The same hatred of ethnic non-Arabs that is present in the South, is driving the ethnic cleansing in Darfur. I don't think it is necessary to go into the whole Darfur history but I wanted to draw the connection between fighting black Africans in the South and in Darfur.
Now to bring it all together. Sudan wants freedom of action within its own territory and therefore, the government has consistently opposed international pressure to stop the killing as well as blocked the deployment of large-scale UN and AU peacekeeping missions in Sudan. As such, it is clearly unhappy with the deployment of the EUFOR mission on the Chad-Sudan border and today's skirmish sets the tone for Sudan's attitude and future reactions toward EUFOR. How can the government survive the international pressure? Through the protection of China which is the number one customer of Sudanese oil.
So to recap. Sudan's Arab government is continuing attacks on non-Arabs in Darfur and is potentially restarting fighting in the Abyei region of the South. Attacks against international peacekeepers operating out of Chad are a reflection of Sudanese animosity towards international efforts to intervene in Sudan. Sudan can afford to do so because of the oil it sells to China, some of which is at stake in the fighting in the South.
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Hodgepodge
Today's post does not have a central focus but is instead intended to be a roundup of previously discussed issues and a mention of stories in the news with relevance to Africa.
Uganda
Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, has demanded that no complete resolution of the conflict is possible in Uganda, unless the government can get the ICC to remove its indictment and warrant for Kony on charges of war crimes. Kony fears that despite Ugandan assurances that alleged war crimes will be dealt with in a national court, the existence of the ICC warrant may still be used to bring him to stand trial in The Hague. This is an extension of the problems discussed earlier of ICC action impeding domestic conflict resolution.
Kenya
Speaking of domestic conflict resolution, today in Kenya President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader, Raila Odinga, have signed an agreement creating a national unity government with a powerful prime minister position for Odinga. While this is obviously a step in the right direction and I begrudgingly applaud Kofi Annan's mediation, I believe that the fissures caused by the explosion of violence in the country will not be resolved as easily. The road to national ethnic reconciliation between the Kikuyu and other ethnic groups is a long one indeed.
France in Africa
President Nicholas Sarkozy in a speech to the South African parliament has announced that France will revamp the system of defense agreements it has with African nations and make the details of the arrangements transparent. France, he said, does not want to maintain a military presence on the continent indefinitely and seeks first and foremost to help Africa build its own collective security apparatus. Simultaneously, however, Sarkozy announced an initiative to give 10 billion Euros over the next 5 years to Sub-Saharan African countries in bilateral relationships and that French forces will join with South African forces to help reform Central African Republic security forces.
Personally, I am skeptical of Sarkozy's intentions. While France may indeed scale down its military presence from its current bases in Senegal, Gabon, Djibouti, Chad, Cote D'Ivoire, and the CAR, it still considers its former colonies part of La Francophonie and has significant economic interests in the region. That being said, it is unclear if France plans on having its influence diminish just because fewer troops are on the ground.
Southern Sudan
I want to applaud Nicholas Kristof for his opinion piece in today's NY Times about a potential future genocide in Southern Sudan. For as long as the media has focused on Darfur, I have consistently asked why has no attention been paid to Southern Sudan where far more people have been killed over a much longer period of time. I concur with Kristof's concern over the unimplemented peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLA (Southern People's Liberation Army) coming to fruition in the long run. Further, if conflict does indeed restart, I question if Sudan's territorial integrity will hold together the muslim arab north and the black christian and animist south. I also agree that the US can use its influence now to help resolve the problem although I would not be in favor of US troops on the ground should large-scale violence break out again. Kristof's suggestion of a no-fly zone, is in my view strategically unfeasible since Southern Sudan is a 900 miles from the closest US airfield in Djibouti.
Army Field Manual
Finally, tomorrow the US army will be releasing a revised field manual, the first since 9/11. The manual is attracting attention because it recognizes the need for a stability operations doctrine in addition to conventional forms of warfare. Obviously, Iraq and Afghanistan are the impetus for the change but I think that such operations are likely to be launched by AFRICOM as well. This is just something to keep in the back of your mind, if in fact we do see a US military presence on the continent over the next 10-15 years.
Uganda
Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, has demanded that no complete resolution of the conflict is possible in Uganda, unless the government can get the ICC to remove its indictment and warrant for Kony on charges of war crimes. Kony fears that despite Ugandan assurances that alleged war crimes will be dealt with in a national court, the existence of the ICC warrant may still be used to bring him to stand trial in The Hague. This is an extension of the problems discussed earlier of ICC action impeding domestic conflict resolution.
Kenya
Speaking of domestic conflict resolution, today in Kenya President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader, Raila Odinga, have signed an agreement creating a national unity government with a powerful prime minister position for Odinga. While this is obviously a step in the right direction and I begrudgingly applaud Kofi Annan's mediation, I believe that the fissures caused by the explosion of violence in the country will not be resolved as easily. The road to national ethnic reconciliation between the Kikuyu and other ethnic groups is a long one indeed.
France in Africa
President Nicholas Sarkozy in a speech to the South African parliament has announced that France will revamp the system of defense agreements it has with African nations and make the details of the arrangements transparent. France, he said, does not want to maintain a military presence on the continent indefinitely and seeks first and foremost to help Africa build its own collective security apparatus. Simultaneously, however, Sarkozy announced an initiative to give 10 billion Euros over the next 5 years to Sub-Saharan African countries in bilateral relationships and that French forces will join with South African forces to help reform Central African Republic security forces.
Personally, I am skeptical of Sarkozy's intentions. While France may indeed scale down its military presence from its current bases in Senegal, Gabon, Djibouti, Chad, Cote D'Ivoire, and the CAR, it still considers its former colonies part of La Francophonie and has significant economic interests in the region. That being said, it is unclear if France plans on having its influence diminish just because fewer troops are on the ground.
Southern Sudan
I want to applaud Nicholas Kristof for his opinion piece in today's NY Times about a potential future genocide in Southern Sudan. For as long as the media has focused on Darfur, I have consistently asked why has no attention been paid to Southern Sudan where far more people have been killed over a much longer period of time. I concur with Kristof's concern over the unimplemented peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLA (Southern People's Liberation Army) coming to fruition in the long run. Further, if conflict does indeed restart, I question if Sudan's territorial integrity will hold together the muslim arab north and the black christian and animist south. I also agree that the US can use its influence now to help resolve the problem although I would not be in favor of US troops on the ground should large-scale violence break out again. Kristof's suggestion of a no-fly zone, is in my view strategically unfeasible since Southern Sudan is a 900 miles from the closest US airfield in Djibouti.
Army Field Manual
Finally, tomorrow the US army will be releasing a revised field manual, the first since 9/11. The manual is attracting attention because it recognizes the need for a stability operations doctrine in addition to conventional forms of warfare. Obviously, Iraq and Afghanistan are the impetus for the change but I think that such operations are likely to be launched by AFRICOM as well. This is just something to keep in the back of your mind, if in fact we do see a US military presence on the continent over the next 10-15 years.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
Regionalization of Conflict, the economic side
One of my academic interests in regard to the study of African conflict is the so called regionalization of conflict. That is to say, due to a number of circumstances including the manner in which borders were drawn, the presence of co-ethnics across international borders, topographical and geographical features, violence within one state can oftentimes quickly spread to its neighbors. This is a particular problem in Africa where many of the borders are artificially drawn. I usually focus on this phenomenon in regard to the spread of violence and war. The ongoing civil strife in Kenya, however, has highlighted in my mind, what may be a mutated version of the regionalization of conflict concept. A situation whereby domestic violence in one state has dilatory effects on its neighbors not by spreading violence but by hurting the regional economy.
What am I talking about? Over the past two months, civil violence has exploded across Kenya as a result of President Mwai Kibaki's rigging of elections in order to keep from power opposition leader Raila Odinga. Much of the violence is overlaid with an ethnic component. Kibaki is part of the majority Kikuyu ethnic group which has dominated the country since independence in December 1963. Odinga, is a Luo, and he represents the smaller ethnic groups in Kenya who have lost out to the Kikuyu.
One of the consequences of the violence has been the disruption of international trade that moves through Kenya; the economic key to east and central Africa because of its ports, rail, and road links to the interior. Thus, what happens in Kenya, affects Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and southern Sudan.
The bulk of the trade goes through the the deep water port of Mombasa on the southeastern coast, the largest port in East Africa. From there, goods move by rail through Nairobi and into Uganda, and from there by road to Rwanda, Burundi, southern Sudan and eastern DRC. The areas of Kenya that have seen the most violence are the population centers in the Rift Valley through which the railway runs including Nairobi, Naivasha, Nakuru, and Eldoret.
The logical follow-on question is why not divert the goods someplace else. The problems are as follows. First, there are no other large seaports or rail lines in Kenya to avoid the violent areas. Second, Somalia to the north is not an option because of internal collapse and pirates in Somali waters. (Yes, I did write pirates.) Finally, Tanzania would be the logical alternative but because Tanzania was not originally a British colony, the rail network built in Tanzania does not go to Uganda and there are few roads into Burundi, Rwanda, and eastern DRC. Goods can be moved from Dar es Salaam to Uganda, but it costs much more, is further away, takes longer and Dar es Salaam cannot handle the same amount of goods as Mombasa. The only truly practical way to get to the Great Lakes region is through Uganda and the only way to deliver vast amounts of goods to Uganda is by rail or road through Kenya. Mombasa is 750 miles from Kampala, the capital of Uganda.
What are the effects? For starters the UN has reported a decrease of humanitarian aid moving through Kampala which originates in Kenya. An alternative consideration has been moving the aid from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to Port Bell on Lake Victoria, and then across to Uganda but the infrastructure does not exist for such an operation. Thus, if violence persists in Kenya for the foreseeable future, shortages may occur and prices may increase across the region. Something to think about when the news reports on developments in Kenya, it is not just Kenyans who stand to lose from continuing violence.
What am I talking about? Over the past two months, civil violence has exploded across Kenya as a result of President Mwai Kibaki's rigging of elections in order to keep from power opposition leader Raila Odinga. Much of the violence is overlaid with an ethnic component. Kibaki is part of the majority Kikuyu ethnic group which has dominated the country since independence in December 1963. Odinga, is a Luo, and he represents the smaller ethnic groups in Kenya who have lost out to the Kikuyu.
One of the consequences of the violence has been the disruption of international trade that moves through Kenya; the economic key to east and central Africa because of its ports, rail, and road links to the interior. Thus, what happens in Kenya, affects Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and southern Sudan.
The bulk of the trade goes through the the deep water port of Mombasa on the southeastern coast, the largest port in East Africa. From there, goods move by rail through Nairobi and into Uganda, and from there by road to Rwanda, Burundi, southern Sudan and eastern DRC. The areas of Kenya that have seen the most violence are the population centers in the Rift Valley through which the railway runs including Nairobi, Naivasha, Nakuru, and Eldoret.
The logical follow-on question is why not divert the goods someplace else. The problems are as follows. First, there are no other large seaports or rail lines in Kenya to avoid the violent areas. Second, Somalia to the north is not an option because of internal collapse and pirates in Somali waters. (Yes, I did write pirates.) Finally, Tanzania would be the logical alternative but because Tanzania was not originally a British colony, the rail network built in Tanzania does not go to Uganda and there are few roads into Burundi, Rwanda, and eastern DRC. Goods can be moved from Dar es Salaam to Uganda, but it costs much more, is further away, takes longer and Dar es Salaam cannot handle the same amount of goods as Mombasa. The only truly practical way to get to the Great Lakes region is through Uganda and the only way to deliver vast amounts of goods to Uganda is by rail or road through Kenya. Mombasa is 750 miles from Kampala, the capital of Uganda.
What are the effects? For starters the UN has reported a decrease of humanitarian aid moving through Kampala which originates in Kenya. An alternative consideration has been moving the aid from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to Port Bell on Lake Victoria, and then across to Uganda but the infrastructure does not exist for such an operation. Thus, if violence persists in Kenya for the foreseeable future, shortages may occur and prices may increase across the region. Something to think about when the news reports on developments in Kenya, it is not just Kenyans who stand to lose from continuing violence.
Monday, February 25, 2008
Ethiopia, Human Rights, and the War on Terror
In today's LA Times, Ronan Farrow, a Yale Law School student and son of Mia Farrow and Woody Allen, wrote an opinion piece entitled "Ethiopia's war against its own". In the article, he writes about the human rights violations committed by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) against ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Farrow, however, seeks not only to bring the story to light but he takes it further quoting Ogadeni refugees in Kenya as blaming the United States more than the Ethiopian government because the US supplies Ethiopia with military aid and arguing that because the US needs Ethiopian cooperation to fight the war on terrorism it looks the other way regarding human rights abuses. Farrow concludes by saying the US should make aid conditional on Ethiopia taking action to prevent future human rights violations.
I have a number of problems with the piece. First, while the Ethiopians may indeed be guilty of their alleged crimes, Farrow neglects to mention that ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden have been fighting a separatist war against the central government since at least 1977, when Somalia invaded Ethiopia in order to make good on irredentist claims for the region. I say this not to excuse the ENDF but to point out that the Ogadenis are not completely innocent and the situation is not as clear cut as presented.
Second, Farrow writes that historically the US has supplied Ethiopia with military aid. This is not true. While a defense pact was signed in 1953, from 1974-1991 Ethiopia was ruled by a Marxist-Leninist leader Haile Mariam Mengistu. During this period the US provided no military aid to Ethiopia which in fact was supplied by the Soviet Union in another episode of Cold War rivalry, this time played out in Africa. Much of the military hardware still used by the ENDF including tanks, aircraft and helicopters are are Soviet made. Further, the main infantry assault rifle is the AK-47. Only after Mengistu was overthrown was US military aid resumed.
Finally and in my view most importantly, Farrow makes it seem that the US contributes a massive amount of military aid to Ethiopia and that Ethiopia relies on that aid to arm and pay its soldiers. He writes: "The bullet that shattered Hamad's hip, and the gun that fired it, were likely supplied by the United States. The soldier who pulled the trigger was almost certainly compensated with U.S. military aid." The numbers, however, tell a different story. The ENDF is 200,000 strong and the 2008 defense budget is 3.5 billion Ethiopian birr or $385 million. How much is provided by the US? In FY 2007, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) from the US to Ethiopia was a grand total of $2.7 million and the requested amount for FY 2008 was $1.5 million. Given the tiny proportion of US military aid relative to the overall defense budget, it seems that in fact the bullet that shattered Hamad's hip and the gun that fired it were NOT likely supplied by the US and the soldier who pulled the trigger was almost certainly NOT compensated with US military aid. Farrow tries to link the human rights abuses to the US military aid and to the uninformed reader it seems plausible, looking at the numbers though it seems highly suspect.
For me the piece reflects something larger. A worldview and an understanding of how US foreign policy should be conducted different from my own. Farrow believes, I think, that human rights should be a primary factor in influencing which countries the US engages and the manner in which that is done. His argument regarding Ethiopia is that it doesn't matter how valuable Ethiopia is in terms of fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa or how important its role a strategic ally, if it is guilty of HR abuses the US should make aid to conditional. Further, he argues US support is largely self-defeating because by supporting a government that commits human rights will only increase the number of terrorists.
I am not anti-Human Rights, although I have quite a different idea of what human rights are relative to the UN Human Rights Council. However, I don't believe that HR should be the primary factor driving foreign policy strategy especially when in regard to military and security issues. We are not yet at a point in time where US national interests play a secondary role to greater global concerns. Realpolitik is oftentimes the necessary mindset for conducting proper foreign policy. The world is not a safe and happy place and sometimes to achieve our goals we must work with unsavory characters, just like the US was an ally of the USSR during WWII and the US funded the Mujahadeen when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. So to in the war on terror; right now the chief threat to the US is Islamic terrorism. And while sometimes in the past that threat has been exaggerated, it is nevertheless a clear and present danger. There are bad people who want to do harm to our country, our citizens, and our interests because they don't like our values and our way of life. Protecting America and American interests is paramount to our allies' human rights records. Aid to our allies in Africa should be appropriated with that in mind.
I have a number of problems with the piece. First, while the Ethiopians may indeed be guilty of their alleged crimes, Farrow neglects to mention that ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden have been fighting a separatist war against the central government since at least 1977, when Somalia invaded Ethiopia in order to make good on irredentist claims for the region. I say this not to excuse the ENDF but to point out that the Ogadenis are not completely innocent and the situation is not as clear cut as presented.
Second, Farrow writes that historically the US has supplied Ethiopia with military aid. This is not true. While a defense pact was signed in 1953, from 1974-1991 Ethiopia was ruled by a Marxist-Leninist leader Haile Mariam Mengistu. During this period the US provided no military aid to Ethiopia which in fact was supplied by the Soviet Union in another episode of Cold War rivalry, this time played out in Africa. Much of the military hardware still used by the ENDF including tanks, aircraft and helicopters are are Soviet made. Further, the main infantry assault rifle is the AK-47. Only after Mengistu was overthrown was US military aid resumed.
Finally and in my view most importantly, Farrow makes it seem that the US contributes a massive amount of military aid to Ethiopia and that Ethiopia relies on that aid to arm and pay its soldiers. He writes: "The bullet that shattered Hamad's hip, and the gun that fired it, were likely supplied by the United States. The soldier who pulled the trigger was almost certainly compensated with U.S. military aid." The numbers, however, tell a different story. The ENDF is 200,000 strong and the 2008 defense budget is 3.5 billion Ethiopian birr or $385 million. How much is provided by the US? In FY 2007, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) from the US to Ethiopia was a grand total of $2.7 million and the requested amount for FY 2008 was $1.5 million. Given the tiny proportion of US military aid relative to the overall defense budget, it seems that in fact the bullet that shattered Hamad's hip and the gun that fired it were NOT likely supplied by the US and the soldier who pulled the trigger was almost certainly NOT compensated with US military aid. Farrow tries to link the human rights abuses to the US military aid and to the uninformed reader it seems plausible, looking at the numbers though it seems highly suspect.
For me the piece reflects something larger. A worldview and an understanding of how US foreign policy should be conducted different from my own. Farrow believes, I think, that human rights should be a primary factor in influencing which countries the US engages and the manner in which that is done. His argument regarding Ethiopia is that it doesn't matter how valuable Ethiopia is in terms of fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa or how important its role a strategic ally, if it is guilty of HR abuses the US should make aid to conditional. Further, he argues US support is largely self-defeating because by supporting a government that commits human rights will only increase the number of terrorists.
I am not anti-Human Rights, although I have quite a different idea of what human rights are relative to the UN Human Rights Council. However, I don't believe that HR should be the primary factor driving foreign policy strategy especially when in regard to military and security issues. We are not yet at a point in time where US national interests play a secondary role to greater global concerns. Realpolitik is oftentimes the necessary mindset for conducting proper foreign policy. The world is not a safe and happy place and sometimes to achieve our goals we must work with unsavory characters, just like the US was an ally of the USSR during WWII and the US funded the Mujahadeen when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. So to in the war on terror; right now the chief threat to the US is Islamic terrorism. And while sometimes in the past that threat has been exaggerated, it is nevertheless a clear and present danger. There are bad people who want to do harm to our country, our citizens, and our interests because they don't like our values and our way of life. Protecting America and American interests is paramount to our allies' human rights records. Aid to our allies in Africa should be appropriated with that in mind.
LRA and my unprinted letter to the LA Times
Over the weekend, the LRA and Ugandan government agreed to a permanent cease-fire which will hopefully bring an end to hostilities. The LRA has agreed to no longer recruit or rearm in exchange for senior people being considered for political, diplomatic, and military posts. As was discussed last week, a settlement was already agreed upon for the adjudication of alleged war crimes by a specially created branch of the Ugandan High Court and not the ICC. The sole remaining issue to be worked out is the integration of LRA fighters into the Ugandan army which will be based on rank and experience. Thus, there is an expectation that peace will finally come to Uganda.
As I discussed in the previous post, Rosa Brooks wrote an editorial about AFRICOM in last Thursday's LA Times, the following is the letter I sent to the LA Times which was not printed.
In alluding to the newly-created AFRICOM as a Bush administrationproject to insert the United States into a neo-colonial scramble forAfrica ("Bush's Africa burden" Opinion, Feb. 21), Rosa Brooks raisesdubious concerns over what was simply a long overdue reorganization ofU.S. Unified Combatant Commands. Recognizing that in the 21st centurygreater U.S. attention will be focused on Africa, the Pentagon shiftedthe area of responsibility for the 53 African countries to onemilitary command instead of the previous three. A new strategy thatincreases the role of diplomatic and civilian programs alongsidemilitary and security operations should be commended for itsinnovation, not have its motives questioned. The creation of acombatant command for Africa does not imply taking up a Kipling-esquewhite man's burden anymore than did the creation of EUCOM, PACOM,CENTCOM, or SOUTHCOM.
As I discussed in the previous post, Rosa Brooks wrote an editorial about AFRICOM in last Thursday's LA Times, the following is the letter I sent to the LA Times which was not printed.
In alluding to the newly-created AFRICOM as a Bush administrationproject to insert the United States into a neo-colonial scramble forAfrica ("Bush's Africa burden" Opinion, Feb. 21), Rosa Brooks raisesdubious concerns over what was simply a long overdue reorganization ofU.S. Unified Combatant Commands. Recognizing that in the 21st centurygreater U.S. attention will be focused on Africa, the Pentagon shiftedthe area of responsibility for the 53 African countries to onemilitary command instead of the previous three. A new strategy thatincreases the role of diplomatic and civilian programs alongsidemilitary and security operations should be commended for itsinnovation, not have its motives questioned. The creation of acombatant command for Africa does not imply taking up a Kipling-esquewhite man's burden anymore than did the creation of EUCOM, PACOM,CENTCOM, or SOUTHCOM.
Thursday, February 21, 2008
Uganda (continued), President Bush in Africa, and AFRICOM
It appears that the prospects for a final resolution to the fighting in Uganda, raised after a monumental agreement between the LRA and the Ugandan government to set up a national war crimes tribunal, have dimmed as the LRA has walked out of peace talks in Juba, southern Sudan. The LRA has reportedly demanded cash payments as well as a large number of government posts in order to bring the conflict to a close. The Ugandan government has expectedly and understandably refused such demands and the talks are now in limbo. Stay tuned to see how the resolution of this 20 year long conflict plays out.
In a related topic, the ICC has stated that the arrest warrants for the three leaders of the LRA still stand despite the tentative agreement between the Ugandan government and LRA to set up a special division of the High Court of Uganda to try serious crime cases. The warrants will only be lifted "when the ICC judges determine whether national trials are an adequate alternative to prosecution". So much for an independent and sovereign judiciary.
President Bush's tour of five African nations this week has come to a close. The trip has garnered much attention, largely positive, about the Bush administration's programs in Africa geared to combatting malaria, HIV/Aids, etc. In fact, today's Financial Times, lauded Mr. Bush's positive legacy of expending 'an extraordinary effort in the international fight against HIV/Aids'. The highlight of the President's effort has been the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (Pepfar), which has thus far led to earmarks of $15 billion to be spent in Africa. The FT, however, is not entirely pleased with Mr. Bush's program and suggested several changes including removal of restrictive spending, direct support to local health initiatives, and the greater need for accountability.
I have two reactions to the piece besides the obvious shock at a newspaper commending the President's program. First, I agree wholeheartedly with the FT's criticism of the NGO community for taking too much of the money that is donated for development and aid. An entire economy has arisen out of the practices of the NGOs which have created a system in which the giving of money has become paramount. The corollary is the FT's second criticism that better accounting and transparency is necessary. There has not been any clear indication that the billions of dollars donated have resulted in actual positive changes on the ground. This comes to the core of what annoys me about the development community, and I am stereotyping though I shouldn't, they want to give the money more than the Africans want to take it. (That line paraphrases William Easterly author of White Man's Burden) When that happens corruption ensues and results no longer meet expectations. The bottom line has become giving, achievement is secondary, if relevant at all. Thus, while its great that President Bush has a postive legacy in helping fight HIV, its not clear to me that Pepfar has actually done so. It has just sent US taxpayer dollars to NGOs operating in Africa.
Second, earmarks that restrict spending are necessary, when discussing such large amounts of money and this follows from what I wrote above. If the US government is going to give billions of dollars to a cause, it absolutely has the right to dictate how that money is to be spent. Giving it to the NGOs who run the development programs or directly to African governments is simply irresponsible and breeds an atmosphere that will likely lead to corruption. On that note, the US should expand its presence on the ground, and not rely on private organizations and charities to dispense the monies. This would mean a large increase in Peace Corps and USAID presence.
Finally, while AFRICOM was created by presidential order in February 2007, it has rarely been in the news. With the President's trip this week and the announcement that for the near future the HQ will remain in Stuttgart, its existence has made its way to the mainstream news media. In today's LA Times, Rosa Brooks, who I am absolutely not a fan of, writes that AFRICOM may be the President's most enduring legacy for Africa, 'the most significant US foreign and military policy innovation you've probably never heard of.' Brooks goes on to write about how despite the stated purposes for the creation of the combatant command, it smacks of Kipling-style White Man's Burden attitude and that in fact the US does indeed have a military interest on the continent. I have several responses to her snide and sarcastic comments, which I hope will be printed as a Letter to the Editor. First, the creation of Africom was long overdue. Unified combatant commands have been in existence since 1946 and in their present form since Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. The Pentagon has split the world up already, now Africa is not split into three but unified under one command. Second, with the spread of terrorism, drugs, and Africa's veritable treasure trove of natural resources which China has already begun to take advantage of (see Sudan), now is absolutely the time for the US to have greater involvement in Africa. To ensure the security of US interests. If that means a greater diplomatic and humanitarian role to aid African governments all the better. Finally, the creation of a combatant command for Africa does not imply a Kipling-esque White Man's Burden anymore than does a US presence in other foreign countries ie Germany, Japan, South Korea. Especially since AFRICOM is still currently based in Germany.
In a related topic, the ICC has stated that the arrest warrants for the three leaders of the LRA still stand despite the tentative agreement between the Ugandan government and LRA to set up a special division of the High Court of Uganda to try serious crime cases. The warrants will only be lifted "when the ICC judges determine whether national trials are an adequate alternative to prosecution". So much for an independent and sovereign judiciary.
President Bush's tour of five African nations this week has come to a close. The trip has garnered much attention, largely positive, about the Bush administration's programs in Africa geared to combatting malaria, HIV/Aids, etc. In fact, today's Financial Times, lauded Mr. Bush's positive legacy of expending 'an extraordinary effort in the international fight against HIV/Aids'. The highlight of the President's effort has been the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (Pepfar), which has thus far led to earmarks of $15 billion to be spent in Africa. The FT, however, is not entirely pleased with Mr. Bush's program and suggested several changes including removal of restrictive spending, direct support to local health initiatives, and the greater need for accountability.
I have two reactions to the piece besides the obvious shock at a newspaper commending the President's program. First, I agree wholeheartedly with the FT's criticism of the NGO community for taking too much of the money that is donated for development and aid. An entire economy has arisen out of the practices of the NGOs which have created a system in which the giving of money has become paramount. The corollary is the FT's second criticism that better accounting and transparency is necessary. There has not been any clear indication that the billions of dollars donated have resulted in actual positive changes on the ground. This comes to the core of what annoys me about the development community, and I am stereotyping though I shouldn't, they want to give the money more than the Africans want to take it. (That line paraphrases William Easterly author of White Man's Burden) When that happens corruption ensues and results no longer meet expectations. The bottom line has become giving, achievement is secondary, if relevant at all. Thus, while its great that President Bush has a postive legacy in helping fight HIV, its not clear to me that Pepfar has actually done so. It has just sent US taxpayer dollars to NGOs operating in Africa.
Second, earmarks that restrict spending are necessary, when discussing such large amounts of money and this follows from what I wrote above. If the US government is going to give billions of dollars to a cause, it absolutely has the right to dictate how that money is to be spent. Giving it to the NGOs who run the development programs or directly to African governments is simply irresponsible and breeds an atmosphere that will likely lead to corruption. On that note, the US should expand its presence on the ground, and not rely on private organizations and charities to dispense the monies. This would mean a large increase in Peace Corps and USAID presence.
Finally, while AFRICOM was created by presidential order in February 2007, it has rarely been in the news. With the President's trip this week and the announcement that for the near future the HQ will remain in Stuttgart, its existence has made its way to the mainstream news media. In today's LA Times, Rosa Brooks, who I am absolutely not a fan of, writes that AFRICOM may be the President's most enduring legacy for Africa, 'the most significant US foreign and military policy innovation you've probably never heard of.' Brooks goes on to write about how despite the stated purposes for the creation of the combatant command, it smacks of Kipling-style White Man's Burden attitude and that in fact the US does indeed have a military interest on the continent. I have several responses to her snide and sarcastic comments, which I hope will be printed as a Letter to the Editor. First, the creation of Africom was long overdue. Unified combatant commands have been in existence since 1946 and in their present form since Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. The Pentagon has split the world up already, now Africa is not split into three but unified under one command. Second, with the spread of terrorism, drugs, and Africa's veritable treasure trove of natural resources which China has already begun to take advantage of (see Sudan), now is absolutely the time for the US to have greater involvement in Africa. To ensure the security of US interests. If that means a greater diplomatic and humanitarian role to aid African governments all the better. Finally, the creation of a combatant command for Africa does not imply a Kipling-esque White Man's Burden anymore than does a US presence in other foreign countries ie Germany, Japan, South Korea. Especially since AFRICOM is still currently based in Germany.
Tuesday, February 19, 2008
LRA and Darfur continued and AFRICOM
Two short notes on last week's posts.
First, as a postscript to the discussion over the ICC's conviction of three LRA leaders as an obstacle to the resolution of the fighting in Uganda, the Ugandan government has announced that if a peace deal is reached the three men will be judged by national courts and will not be turned over to The Hague. This, I believe, is the correct decision. Uganda has a fully functioning judiciary and though Uganda is a signatory of the Rome protocol thereby agreeing to the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes in Uganda, only a national judicial solution will bring an end to the 20-year long civil war. By disregarding the international court in favor of a national trial, Uganda has taken one step closer to bringing the violence to an end.
Second, in Darfur the fighting continues unabated. Reuters has reported new attacks by the Sudanese army against insurgents in the West Darfur district. While the extent of the damage is of yet unclear and the statements of the JEM spokesman of Antonov bombers being used must be taken with a grain of salt, it is certain based on neutral witness reports of helicopters taking off and hearing bombs exploding that an operation by the Sudanese army is underway.
Finally, an unrelated issue yet strategically important, the US' newest combatant command, AFRICOM, has announced its headquarters will remain in Stuttgart "for the foreseeable future". The postponement came partly as a result of apprehension of several African countries including Nigeria, Libya, and South Africa of a large US military presence on the continent. The AFRICOM spokesman said, that more time is needed to show what AFRICOM intends to do on the continent; help improve security, train security forces, help prevent the spread of terrorism and assist with humanitarian disasters. At the moment, only Liberia has offered to host the HQ.
First, as a postscript to the discussion over the ICC's conviction of three LRA leaders as an obstacle to the resolution of the fighting in Uganda, the Ugandan government has announced that if a peace deal is reached the three men will be judged by national courts and will not be turned over to The Hague. This, I believe, is the correct decision. Uganda has a fully functioning judiciary and though Uganda is a signatory of the Rome protocol thereby agreeing to the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes in Uganda, only a national judicial solution will bring an end to the 20-year long civil war. By disregarding the international court in favor of a national trial, Uganda has taken one step closer to bringing the violence to an end.
Second, in Darfur the fighting continues unabated. Reuters has reported new attacks by the Sudanese army against insurgents in the West Darfur district. While the extent of the damage is of yet unclear and the statements of the JEM spokesman of Antonov bombers being used must be taken with a grain of salt, it is certain based on neutral witness reports of helicopters taking off and hearing bombs exploding that an operation by the Sudanese army is underway.
Finally, an unrelated issue yet strategically important, the US' newest combatant command, AFRICOM, has announced its headquarters will remain in Stuttgart "for the foreseeable future". The postponement came partly as a result of apprehension of several African countries including Nigeria, Libya, and South Africa of a large US military presence on the continent. The AFRICOM spokesman said, that more time is needed to show what AFRICOM intends to do on the continent; help improve security, train security forces, help prevent the spread of terrorism and assist with humanitarian disasters. At the moment, only Liberia has offered to host the HQ.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
The LRA and the ICC
The BBC has reported that members of the LRA have been on the move in northeastern DRC perhaps heading to the Central African Republic. The LRA, Lord's Resistance Army, is a millenarian Ugandan rebel group based in northern Uganda, which has been fighting the government of Uganda for over 20 years. They have become known for the particular brand of violence they practice which includes mutilation and child-kidnapping. Many of the children are then forced to serve as porters and sex slaves. The leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes.
In this post, I want to use the Uganda case as an example of the deleterious effects the ICC has had on resolving the conflict and the potential problem this may pose in future situations. The court which was established in 1998 and is based in The Hague, Netherlands, was designed to exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The court's jurisdiction covers nationals and territory of States who have signed the ICC treaty and for cases referred by the United Nations Security Council. So far 105 states have joined, including Uganda.
Thus, the ICC's conviction of Kony for war crimes is well within its purview. However, as an independent judicial body, the court's outlook and interest is judicial in nature. While an apolitical court may be theoretically ideal, when its actions affect the resolution of a civil war, which by its nature is very much a political process, the court's actions become less helpful and can actually be harmful.
Recent civil war resolutions have included a number of instruments for reconciliation ranging from war crimes tribunals to amnesties to truth and reconciliation commissions. The type of conflict fought, its effects on a given state, and the manner in which a resolution should be carried out varies from country to country.
In the case of Uganda, however, the ICC's action has effectively tied the hands of the Ugandan government and as a result has prolonged the negotiations for an end to the civil war. Kony is reluctant to end his rebellion because that would mean his going to The Hague, for what is likely to be a long stay. For Kony, continuing the conflict, perhaps indefinitely may prove to be a better option. For the Ugandan government, it must either ignore the ICC's decision, thereby creating problems for themselves at the international organization level, or abide by the ruling and be unable to bring the conflict to a permanent conclusion.
In this post, I want to use the Uganda case as an example of the deleterious effects the ICC has had on resolving the conflict and the potential problem this may pose in future situations. The court which was established in 1998 and is based in The Hague, Netherlands, was designed to exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The court's jurisdiction covers nationals and territory of States who have signed the ICC treaty and for cases referred by the United Nations Security Council. So far 105 states have joined, including Uganda.
Thus, the ICC's conviction of Kony for war crimes is well within its purview. However, as an independent judicial body, the court's outlook and interest is judicial in nature. While an apolitical court may be theoretically ideal, when its actions affect the resolution of a civil war, which by its nature is very much a political process, the court's actions become less helpful and can actually be harmful.
Recent civil war resolutions have included a number of instruments for reconciliation ranging from war crimes tribunals to amnesties to truth and reconciliation commissions. The type of conflict fought, its effects on a given state, and the manner in which a resolution should be carried out varies from country to country.
In the case of Uganda, however, the ICC's action has effectively tied the hands of the Ugandan government and as a result has prolonged the negotiations for an end to the civil war. Kony is reluctant to end his rebellion because that would mean his going to The Hague, for what is likely to be a long stay. For Kony, continuing the conflict, perhaps indefinitely may prove to be a better option. For the Ugandan government, it must either ignore the ICC's decision, thereby creating problems for themselves at the international organization level, or abide by the ruling and be unable to bring the conflict to a permanent conclusion.
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
Ongoing Violence in Darfur
Perhaps lost in the news cycle of this past weekend was renewed attacks by Sudanese government forces on civilians in Darfur, Western Sudan. Attacks against supposed positions of the rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, JEM, have led to another influx of refugees, 12,000 this weekend, across the border into eastern Chad. This has prompted the Prime Minister of Chad, Nouradine Delwa Kassire Koumakoye, to announce that Chad cannot absorb any more refugees from Darfur. Simultaneously, the EU peacekeeping mission to eastern Chad, has resumed and claims it will be operational by month's end.
The EUFOR deployment, however, is only a partial measure to alleviate the violence. It is addressing the symptoms of the civil war in Sudan and not addressing the causes. While refugees in camps in Chad may now be safer and worry less about cross border attacks from Sudan, their co-ethnics still in Sudan continue to face the threat of attack from the Sudanese government and their local allies. The EUFOR will not be able to stop the real cause of fighting in Darfur, the policies of the Sudanese government in Khartoum.
The prospects for changing Sudan's policies, however, are slim. Protected by the Chinese veto in the security council, Sudan has been able to continue operations in Darfur without effective international interdiction. The AU peacekeeping force has been largely ineffective and at times attacked by Sudanese militia forces. Further, it is unlikely that a military operation will be undertaken into Sudanese territory to protect Darfurian civilians. Not only is there little strategic interest beyond protecting human rights, logistically a large scale deployment would be a nightmare and it is unlikely that national populations would support sacrificing their soldiers in Western Sudan.
What hope is there then for the victims? To me it seems that pressuring China is the only available option. The likelihood of that succeeding, however, is far from clear.
The EUFOR deployment, however, is only a partial measure to alleviate the violence. It is addressing the symptoms of the civil war in Sudan and not addressing the causes. While refugees in camps in Chad may now be safer and worry less about cross border attacks from Sudan, their co-ethnics still in Sudan continue to face the threat of attack from the Sudanese government and their local allies. The EUFOR will not be able to stop the real cause of fighting in Darfur, the policies of the Sudanese government in Khartoum.
The prospects for changing Sudan's policies, however, are slim. Protected by the Chinese veto in the security council, Sudan has been able to continue operations in Darfur without effective international interdiction. The AU peacekeeping force has been largely ineffective and at times attacked by Sudanese militia forces. Further, it is unlikely that a military operation will be undertaken into Sudanese territory to protect Darfurian civilians. Not only is there little strategic interest beyond protecting human rights, logistically a large scale deployment would be a nightmare and it is unlikely that national populations would support sacrificing their soldiers in Western Sudan.
What hope is there then for the victims? To me it seems that pressuring China is the only available option. The likelihood of that succeeding, however, is far from clear.
Thursday, February 7, 2008
France's problem with President Idriss Deby
France has a problem with Chad's president, Idriss Deby.
He is guilty of favoring his clan, the Zaghawa, in the distribution of government and military positions. This has caused not unreasonable resenment from the 97% of Chadians who are not Zaghawa. His commitment to human rights, liberal freedoms and other mainstays of western political beliefs has been lacking. And he has been accused of corruption, embezzlement, and failure to meet World Bank requirements in regard to distribution of profits from the country's budding oil industry.
Why then does France continue to support this man staying in power?
Because France has other interests in Africa that supersede the domestic contentment of the Chadian populace. France maintains around 2,000 troops and an air base in Chad. As the former colonial power, it exerts a certain amount of influence on the government as well as preferential treatment by that government. Most recently, as the largest contributor to the nascent EU Force mission to protect Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad, it would be wholely embarrasing to France for that mission which it had pushed for so earnestly to be compromised by problems in its sphere of influence. Thus, not wanting to lose that power, France has again backed an African ally in his time of need, because Deby is better than the Sudanese backed rebels.
I think this highlights one problem many Western and particularly European states encounter in their dealings with Africa nations. They want to help Africa and its citizens with development aid, to teach/impose their Western values to Africans, and they want under-developed African countries to move into the globalized society that the rest of the world is moving quickly toward. Yet despite these high-minded goals, for most countries, realpolitik is not an absent element in their conduct of foreign policy. In many African nations, the former European colonial powers still wish to exert some measure of control, through economic and financial links, or basing rights etc. As a result, dealing with unsavory leaders and regimes is the price of doing business. As long as this remains the reality on the ground, men like Idriss Deby will continue to rule their countries and in so doing, prevent them from resolving conflict and moving forward.
He is guilty of favoring his clan, the Zaghawa, in the distribution of government and military positions. This has caused not unreasonable resenment from the 97% of Chadians who are not Zaghawa. His commitment to human rights, liberal freedoms and other mainstays of western political beliefs has been lacking. And he has been accused of corruption, embezzlement, and failure to meet World Bank requirements in regard to distribution of profits from the country's budding oil industry.
Why then does France continue to support this man staying in power?
Because France has other interests in Africa that supersede the domestic contentment of the Chadian populace. France maintains around 2,000 troops and an air base in Chad. As the former colonial power, it exerts a certain amount of influence on the government as well as preferential treatment by that government. Most recently, as the largest contributor to the nascent EU Force mission to protect Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad, it would be wholely embarrasing to France for that mission which it had pushed for so earnestly to be compromised by problems in its sphere of influence. Thus, not wanting to lose that power, France has again backed an African ally in his time of need, because Deby is better than the Sudanese backed rebels.
I think this highlights one problem many Western and particularly European states encounter in their dealings with Africa nations. They want to help Africa and its citizens with development aid, to teach/impose their Western values to Africans, and they want under-developed African countries to move into the globalized society that the rest of the world is moving quickly toward. Yet despite these high-minded goals, for most countries, realpolitik is not an absent element in their conduct of foreign policy. In many African nations, the former European colonial powers still wish to exert some measure of control, through economic and financial links, or basing rights etc. As a result, dealing with unsavory leaders and regimes is the price of doing business. As long as this remains the reality on the ground, men like Idriss Deby will continue to rule their countries and in so doing, prevent them from resolving conflict and moving forward.
Wednesday, February 6, 2008
Lessons from the Fighting in Chad
This past week's renewed fighting in Chad illustrates a number of lessons about African conflict.
First, a recap of the fighting. Over the past week, a convoy of 300 vehicles and men from three Chadian rebel groups based in Sudan made their way nearly unimpeded across 1,000 km of Chad's territory to the capital city of N'Djamena, on the Cameroon border and the gates of the presidential palace in an effort to overthrow the government of President Idriss Deby. The rebels accuse Deby of corruption, embezzling oil profits, and favoritism towards the Zaghawa clan of which he is a member. The Zaghawa make up only 3% of Chad's population, but hold a disproportionate number of government and military positions. After heavy fighting, the rebels were defeated in the capital and are now in the countryside. For the moment, Deby is still in power with the blessing and backing of the French government.
Some thoughts on the matter.
First, this is yet again another indication of the ease with which fighting can spill over borders. The fighting in Darfur has spurred the departure of refugees into northeastern Central African Republic and eastern Chad. The current estimate is 250,000 Sudanese are now taking refuge in Chad. Further, some of the Sudanese rebels in Darfur belong the same clan, Zaghawa, as President Deby, who has given them support and allowed them to use Chad as a base. In turn, the Sudanese government, despite vehement denials, have provided weapons, vehicles, and medical supplies to the Chadian rebels fighting against Deby's government. I don't believe that the rebels in Chad are merely proxies of the Sudanese government, but they are not innocent of involvement in the internal matters in Chad either. Both Chad and Sudan have a stake in each other's civil wars.
Second, the fighting is incredibly low-tech. Neither the Chadian army nor the rebels have planes, helicopters, or armor of any sort. Warfare is based on trucks and machine guns, which allows for mobility across great distances in a short period of time. This type of fighting can be seen across Africa.
Third, French intervention in Africa is alive and kicking. While the Chadian government has only acknowledges French intelligence and logistical support, it is unlikely that government troops could have stopped the rebels by themselves. After all, the rebels made their way across Chad and into the capital. Today, the BBC has reported French soldiers patrolling the streets of N'Djamena and the helicopters bombing rebel positions outside the city, so it is logical to conclude similar action took place during the fighting in the capital.
The commitment of French troops to its former African colonies, is not a new phenomenon. France has maintained strong ties to most of its former colonies since their independence in the 1960s and continues to maintain bases in Gabon, Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Chad, CAR, and Senegal. The visit today of French Defense minister Herve Morin underscores this ongoing commitment.
The last item to consider is the French-backed EUFOR mission which was supposed to deploy to eastern Chad in support of the Darfurian refugees. Sudan obviously views the mission not as a neutral operation but as a threat and while it is speculation to believe Sudan orchestrated a coup against Deby in order to install a government adverse to the EUFOR and thereby prevent its deployment, it is possible that's what the Sudanese government intended.
First, a recap of the fighting. Over the past week, a convoy of 300 vehicles and men from three Chadian rebel groups based in Sudan made their way nearly unimpeded across 1,000 km of Chad's territory to the capital city of N'Djamena, on the Cameroon border and the gates of the presidential palace in an effort to overthrow the government of President Idriss Deby. The rebels accuse Deby of corruption, embezzling oil profits, and favoritism towards the Zaghawa clan of which he is a member. The Zaghawa make up only 3% of Chad's population, but hold a disproportionate number of government and military positions. After heavy fighting, the rebels were defeated in the capital and are now in the countryside. For the moment, Deby is still in power with the blessing and backing of the French government.
Some thoughts on the matter.
First, this is yet again another indication of the ease with which fighting can spill over borders. The fighting in Darfur has spurred the departure of refugees into northeastern Central African Republic and eastern Chad. The current estimate is 250,000 Sudanese are now taking refuge in Chad. Further, some of the Sudanese rebels in Darfur belong the same clan, Zaghawa, as President Deby, who has given them support and allowed them to use Chad as a base. In turn, the Sudanese government, despite vehement denials, have provided weapons, vehicles, and medical supplies to the Chadian rebels fighting against Deby's government. I don't believe that the rebels in Chad are merely proxies of the Sudanese government, but they are not innocent of involvement in the internal matters in Chad either. Both Chad and Sudan have a stake in each other's civil wars.
Second, the fighting is incredibly low-tech. Neither the Chadian army nor the rebels have planes, helicopters, or armor of any sort. Warfare is based on trucks and machine guns, which allows for mobility across great distances in a short period of time. This type of fighting can be seen across Africa.
Third, French intervention in Africa is alive and kicking. While the Chadian government has only acknowledges French intelligence and logistical support, it is unlikely that government troops could have stopped the rebels by themselves. After all, the rebels made their way across Chad and into the capital. Today, the BBC has reported French soldiers patrolling the streets of N'Djamena and the helicopters bombing rebel positions outside the city, so it is logical to conclude similar action took place during the fighting in the capital.
The commitment of French troops to its former African colonies, is not a new phenomenon. France has maintained strong ties to most of its former colonies since their independence in the 1960s and continues to maintain bases in Gabon, Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Chad, CAR, and Senegal. The visit today of French Defense minister Herve Morin underscores this ongoing commitment.
The last item to consider is the French-backed EUFOR mission which was supposed to deploy to eastern Chad in support of the Darfurian refugees. Sudan obviously views the mission not as a neutral operation but as a threat and while it is speculation to believe Sudan orchestrated a coup against Deby in order to install a government adverse to the EUFOR and thereby prevent its deployment, it is possible that's what the Sudanese government intended.
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